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The modern debate over the scope of the federal government’s treaty-making power
is largely framed by motivated histories written at the turn of the last century. These
histories, by and large, gave a legal imprimatur to the acquisition of the insular
possessions and the exercise of colonial government over them. A principal contribution
of these constitutional histories was to make it an obvious proposition that the American
treaty-making power contained the law-of-nations power to acquire territory and to
take an imperial sovereign’s original title to it: “What Spain could do we can do.”
This Article contends that these imperial and canonical histories of the treatymaking power erased a vibrant and contrary view of American foreign-aﬀairs
federalism. This now-interred theory of American foreign-aﬀairs federalism, which
produced victories in several important public law disputes in prior eras, argued that
the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of sovereign power to the popular sovereign
proscribed both the state and federal governments from exercising an “eminent
dominion” over territory. That is to say, this rival view forbade both the state and
federal governments from acquiring territory, ceding territory, and holding original
title to territory so acquired. Crucially, this idea rejected altogether the familiar lens
of “dual-sovereignty” in limiting the foreign-aﬀairs powers of American governments.
This Article traces the arc of the erased idea about the American governments’
foreign-aﬀairs powers through bureaucratic archives, state and federal court decisions,
and various sources of elite legal opinion. In accounting for the bygone victories of the
now-dormant idea, as well as the ultimate defeat of that idea at the hands of imperial
bureaucrats, the Article sheds new light on one of the central preoccupations of the
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modern public law governing America’s foreign relations. I contend that the imperial
history continues to cast a dubious shadow over our current debates about the treatymaking power and the status of American territory that is not yet a state. And I argue
that modern federal courts’ reliance on historically inflected arguments about our
foreign-aﬀairs powers is often fundamentally misguided. Our received constitutional
histories from the early-twentieth century are often motivated glosses—sometimes
committed to shoring up an imperial enterprise—that do not oﬀer neutral principles
to settle our hard cases.
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INTRODUCTION
In April of 1911, John Bassett Moore, a law professor, statesman, and
sometime-judge on the Permanent Court of International Justice, delivered a
series of lectures at Johns Hopkins University on the history of American
government. Moore explained that in undertaking these lectures, his ﬁrst
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duty as a historian was to “deal[] in realities.”1 Surveying the prior century,
Moore explained that there had been, in reality, several “phases” in the
political development of American public law: the ﬁrst was “federalism,” and
the two most recent were “imperialism” and “expansion.”2 In Moore’s view,
the latter phases involved frequent acquisitions of new territories and peoples,
despite the clamor of those who argued that “[w]e do not want more territory
any more than we want ﬁsh bones in our coﬀee.”3 Indeed, he noted, “the ﬁsh
bones have continued to appear in our cups and we have continued to gulp
them down without any specially unseemly grimaces.”4
Moore’s theory of the development of American public law, and his eﬀort
to discern a long arc of history culminating in the recent imperial acquisitions,
mirrored views held by many other prominent professors, bureaucrats, and
courts of his time. These curators of constitutional culture left behind a nowcanonical history of American foreign-aﬀairs federalism that pervades
modern debates concerning the power to acquire territory by treaty and to
subject it to the sovereignty of Congress.
In a debate now lost to modern legal argument, this imperial history of
our governments’ foreign-aﬀairs powers reduced a diverse and rivalrous
debate about American federalism to something far simpler. Namely, Moore
and many others jettisoned the longstanding argument that the Tenth
Amendment limits federal treaty-making power not by reserving a plenary
police power over “domestic” concerns to the states (a familiar claim of
modern dual-sovereign federalism), but rather by “reserving” to the people
themselves any use of the treaty-making power that aﬀects the constitutive
relationship between the state and federal governments and the people (call
it popular-sovereign federalism, which sees in our federalism the allocation of
power between state and federal “dual governments”). The popular-sovereign
theory of foreign-aﬀairs power viewed the relevant “sovereign” whose
interests might be infringed by the treaty-making power as the popular
sovereign, and it dismissed appeals to state and federal sovereignty in
understanding the treaty power’s limits. Because neither the state nor the
federal government could engage in this sort of treaty-making, the popularsovereign theory could therefore deﬁne a small but defensible set of subjectmatter limitations on the treaty-making power.
To parse this more carefully: chief among the limitations imposed by
the popular-sovereign view of the treaty-making power is that no

1 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, FOUR PHASES OF AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT: FEDERALISMDEMOCRACY-IMPERIALISM-EXPANSION 6 (1912).
2 Id. at 7.
3 Id. at 149 (internal quotation marks omitted).
4 Id.
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government—neither state nor federal—can claim the sovereign “eminent
dominion” necessary to exercise imperial government over territory outside
of the union. Although, in the American republic, the popular sovereign is
ordinarily dormant,5 its agents cannot act to change its composition by
treaty while it sleeps. Yet that is the subject-matter limitation on the treatymaking power most frequently breached in our constitutional history—
breaches, as I shall argue, that were omitted from canonical histories of the
treaty power to serve imperial ends.
Today, in the wake of the seminal decision of Missouri v. Holland and more
recently in Bond v. United States, we are accustomed to thinking that if the
exercise of the treaty-making power has any limit at all, it must be found in
the balance that “our federalism”6 strikes between the federal and state “dual
sovereigns.” In Holland, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes denied that the
Constitution imposed a subject-matter limitation on the federal treatymaking power within the states; Holmes framed the relevant question as
“whether [a treaty] is forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general
terms of the Tenth Amendment.”7 And in Bond, six Justices avoided revisiting
Holland by creating a federalism-inspired clear-statement rule to narrow a
5 See infra text accompanying note 27 (describing Richard Tuck’s Seeley Lectures on the
“sleeping sovereign”).
6 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 855 (2014) (summarizing Bond’s views
concerning the treaty power’s capacity to “aﬀord the [federal] Government a police power” and
“usurp[] . . . traditional state authority”); id. at 879 (Scalia, J., concurring) (concluding that a case
aﬀording the federal government a broad treaty-making power “places Congress only one treaty
away from acquiring a general police power”); id. at 882 (Thomas, J., concurring) (concluding that
“the Treaty Power . . . is itself a limited power,” as otherwise the Treaty Power “would . . . lodge in
the Federal Government a potential for a ‘police power’ . . . [that] would threaten the ‘liberties that
derive from the diﬀusion of sovereign power’” (citations omitted)); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.
416, 432-433 (1920) (analyzing whether a statute implementing a migratory bird treaty was
unconstitutional because it interfered with rights reserved to the states); Curtis A. Bradley, The
Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 450-461 (1998) (surveying options for
“protecting federalism” from a broad treaty-making power and proposing “equal treatment” of
federal statutes and treaties that attends to the “states’ rights”); David M. Golove, Treaty-Making
and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 1075, 1279-86, 1310-14 (2000) (rejecting Professor Bradley’s proposed limitations on the
treaty-making power in light of the “nationalist” decision by the founders to “lodge the whole of the
foreign-aﬀairs powers exclusively in the national government”); see also Oona Hathaway et al., The
Treaty Power: Its History, Scope, and Limits, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 239, 249 (2013) (canvassing
founding-era history and concluding that the states “g[ave] up all power over foreign relations to
the central government” but retained “structural and procedural checks to protect states’ interests”);
Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist Constraints on the Treaty Power, 79 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1327, 1329-31 (2006) (describing two “camps” that have emerged on the question
whether “federalism constrain[s] the Article II treaty power”: the “nationalists” and the “new
federalists”); Michael D. Ramsey, Missouri v. Holland and Historical Textualism, 73 MO. L. REV.
969, 980 (2008) (oﬀering a “historical textualist” account defending the proposition that “treaties
cannot overturn protections of state sovereignty expressed elsewhere in the Constitution’s text”).
7 252 U.S. at 433-34.

2020]

The Imperial Treaty Power

935

statute implementing a treaty.8 Three Justices in Bond, however, would have
held that American federalism does not tolerate a “conceal[ed] . . . police
power over domestic aﬀairs” and thus must proscribe the federal treatymaking power to make agreements concerning “wholly domestic[]” matters
or agreements that might “regulate the relationship between nations and their
own citizens.”9 Justice Thomas predicted that “the increasing frequency with
which treaties have begun to test the limits of the Treaty Power” would oﬀer
the Court the opportunity to limit the power “soon enough.”10
As I shall argue, however, the more important and now-forgotten limit on
the treaty-making power, which was frequently consequential in our
constitutional history, followed from an altogether diﬀerent view of the
nature of sovereignty in a constitutional republic. Recovering this purged
constitutional history counsels caution about the broad reception of the
history written by law professors, bureaucrats, and courts about the treatymaking power at the turn of the twentieth century. That history still
dominates our modern public law concerning the treaty-making power and
the status of the insular possessions, especially in light of the Court’s
solicitude for constitutional history in these areas.11
8 572 U.S. at 860 (holding that a clear indication from Congress that the relevant federal statute
was designed to supersede state law was necessary before the Court would interpret that federal
statute as intruding on the states’ police power).
9 Id. at 894-96 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quotations marks and citations omitted).
10 Id. at 896 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Bradley, supra note 5, at 402-409).
11 Two caveats about scope: I focus here on the work product of lawyers, courts, and agencies
debating public law questions posed by American treaty-making and the sovereignty of the insular
possessions. Recent historical work on other aspects of American colonialism is vast and vibrant. See
generally Paul A. Kramer, How Not to Write the History of U.S. Empire, 42 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 911
(2018) (collecting books and dissertations on U.S. colonialism since 2007). Relatedly, I focus on one
of two legal questions raised in the treaty-power debate: the scope of the treaty-making power and
the plausibility of subjecting that power to a “subject-matter limitation.” I leave to one side the scope
of Congress’s treaty-implementing power, which receives focused analysis elsewhere. See generally Jean
Galbraith, Congress’s Treaty-Implementing Power in Historical Practice, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 54,
62 (2014); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867, 1868
(2005) (arguing that the capacious view of Congress’s treaty-implementing power set forth in
Missouri v. Holland should be rejected); see also Bond, 572 U.S. at 876 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(adopting Professor Rosenkranz’s approach).
Because my focus is trained on the use of an idea of American federalism in resolving debates
about the foreign-aﬀairs powers of the federal government, and ultimately the reframing of “our
federalism” to accommodate imperial ends, I do not engage directly with the now-ﬂourishing history
of imperial constitutionalism. My focus on the constitutional debate about whether the acquisition
power, the cession power, and the sovereign’s eminent dominion, are part of American “sovereignty,”
is principally motivated by current debates about the federal government’s foreign-aﬀairs powers
and the extent to which these modern debates rest on a contingent settlement concerning the
compatibility of imperial government with American federalism. Tracing the arc of that settlement
does not displace the thought that the broad thrust of American ideological development during
this period included a robust “settler” ideology, which entailed dispossession of indigenous peoples.
See generally AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 12-13 (2010) (describing the
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My aim in what follows is to chart the ﬁnal ascendance—during precisely
the episode of territorial acquisition in which Moore was lecturing—of an
imperial idea of dual sovereignty in the foreign-aﬀairs powers of the
American republic. In doing so, I will show some of the compromises of our
public law that underwrite modern views of the treaty-making power and the
federal government’s special title to acquired territory.
To preview that story, in the century before Moore delivered his history of
our “imperial” phase, the notion that any American government could exercise
a power to acquire, cede, and hold title to territory did cause plenty of
sophisticated commentators to “grimace.”12 Their reactions stemmed from a
credible view of foreign-affairs federalism that rivaled the now-dominant
theory that the federal government may exercise all sovereign powers not
reserved to the states, and especially the treaty powers necessary to practice
imperial government. Instead, the rivals argued that the Constitution
distributes some, but not all, of a sovereign’s powers at international law
between the two principal American governments. Crucially, this theory drew
on the law of nations to posit that with respect to the eminent dominion,13 the
dormant popular sovereign (the people themselves) withheld from their
governments the powers necessary to barter territory or grant title to it.

role of settler ideology in American public law). Nor does my account shed light on the distinctive
development of federal Indian law during this period. See Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as
Paradigm Within Public Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1787 (2019) (calling for a renewed focus on
federal Indian law, and the “tragic history of colonialism and violent dispossession of Native lands”
in understanding American constitutional development); see also id. at 1809-15 (applying this insight
to the treaty-making power). And, ﬁnally, my account does not comprehensively address the vexed
and still-open questions of status and self-government created by the Insular Cases and the theory of
nonincorporated territory. See generally FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE (Christina Duﬀy Burnett
& Burke Marshall eds., 2001); SAM ERMAN, ALMOST CITIZENS: PUERTO RICO, CONSTITUTION,
AND EMPIRE (2018) (elaborating a comprehensive account of the status and naturalization questions
created by the Spanish American War, and the partial resolution of those questions in the Insular
Cases); see also id. at 163 n.4 (collecting scholarship concerning the “imperial turn,” especially in
connection with territories acquired in the Spanish-American War); Christina Duﬀy Burnett,
Untied States: American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 797-98 (2005)
(advancing a “revised understanding” of the Insular Cases that emphasizes their installation of a
“doctrine of territorial deannexation” in constitutional law).
12 See MOORE, supra note 1, at 149.
13 I adopt the nineteenth-century phrase “eminent dominion” to forestall the inaccurate
reduction of the phrase “eminent domain” to the power of taking private property for public
purposes. Instead, these debates concerned a capacious bundle of ideas received, somewhat
haphazardly, from the law-of-nations literature. See JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES 6-9 (1888) (tracing the name “eminent domain” to the
law of nations); James Bradley Thayer, The Right of Eminent Domain, Note, 19 MONTHLY L. REP.
241 (1856); see also Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1696 n.13
(2012) (citing Lewis’s treatise). By nineteenth-century lights, the eminent dominion encompassed
the public powers of acquiring, ceding, and title to land, as well as more familiar rights such as
exclusion and alienation.
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As applied to the federal government’s power to make treaties, the rivals’
view of federalism—which I call throughout “popular-sovereign federalism”
or “dual-government federalism” with reference to the Tenth Amendment’s
text14—provided a workable principle that could limit the federal
government’s foreign-aﬀairs powers. For these proponents, the central
inquiry was which powers the popular sovereign may legitimately delegate at
all to its governmental agents under the law of nations. The law-of-nations
idea of eminent dominion yielded an answer to that inquiry: because
acquisition and cession impermissibly modify the constitutive relationship
between the popular sovereign and its governments, no mere government
could exercise these powers. Because acquiring or ceding territory by treaty
would alter the composition of the republic, these exercises of sovereignty
were denied to all American governments. Lawful acquisition or cession could
only proceed by somehow awakening the popular sovereign and involving it
in the treaty-making process.15
Such limitations on the treaty-making power do not, by contrast, follow
from the dual-sovereign theory of foreign-affairs federalism, which would
attempt to allocate all powers of acquiring and ceding territory between the
federal and state sovereigns. The dual-sovereign approach to the treaty-making
power has foundered for more than a century in identifying some criterion that
might sort the “domestic” from the “international,” or the “police power” from
the “foreign-affairs power,” in order to divide the powers among the sovereigns.
That effort can, moreover, be defeated by the rejoinder that state governments
lack the international legal personality necessary to make treaties with other
sovereigns about plainly urgent “domestic” concerns.16 Indeed, on the question
of acquisition and cession, dual-sovereign federalism yields the least satisfying
account of the treaty power’s limits: treaties accomplishing acquisition and
cession—especially those that purchase peace—are quintessentially
“international,” while also altering the relationship between citizens and their
government in utterly fundamental ways. Such treaties change the balance of
power between states composing the federal union, dilute the existing states’
suffrage in the Senate, and modify the composition of “the people.”
Remarkably, popular-sovereign limitations on the treaty-making power
survived long into our constitutional history and proved decisive in several
episodes of constitutional lawmaking.17 But the popular-sovereign federalism
theory has now been lost to orthodox constitutional history. We are left, instead,
14 U.S. CONST. amend. X (providing that “powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution . . . are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people”).
15 See infra Section II.A.
16 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 54–56 (discussing Sutherland’s defense of a
nationalist treaty-making power).
17 See infra Part II.
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with a history motivated by a dual-sovereign view. This history assumed a
narrow frame for the treaty-power disputes, in service of an early-twentiethcentury project of imperial government. The legacy of that imperial project
continues to animate some of the Supreme Court’s most-watched cases in the
past few Terms, including Bond v. United States and Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle.18
This Article provides an in-depth account of how the claims of the
popular-sovereign’s treaty power, particularly its limitation on American
governments’ capacity to exercise the eminent dominion, have been relegated
from a central situs of partisan conﬂict to the implausible fringes of public
law. The canonical erasure of this idea came at the hands of a generation of
bureaucrats and law professors who were committed to defending territorial
acquisition and imperial government over the insular territories. Although
the Insular Bureau, the State Department, powerful American states, and
land-oﬃce bureaucrats had sometimes embraced the idea that that popular
sovereignty could limit the government’s foreign-aﬀairs powers, this theory
is now a casualty of our imperial ambitions.
As I argue here, the purging of popular-sovereign federalism from the
intellectual history of American public law matters for two reasons. The first is
connected to the partisan disputes that were pivotal in shaping U.S. territory.
That is to say, in debating about the American governments’ “eminent
dominion,” vel non, partisans touched upon fundamental questions about the
composition of the popular sovereign, its relationship to federal and state
governments, and the place of public and private international law in American
public law. These debates coursed through questions about acquiring new
territory (augmenting the popular sovereign), ceding territory (dilacerating
some of the popular sovereign), and the lucrative question of title to public land.
Second, the decline of popular-sovereign federalism has been a loss for
modern battlegrounds that are still active. We have been left with the history,
and the ideas, of the winners. As I will show, this history domesticated some
parts of the nineteenth-century international law canon to serve imperial
ends, shoring up the foreign-aﬀairs powers needed to acquire the insular
possessions and to subject them to the sovereignty of Congress. At virtually
the same time that the imperial histories of the treaty power were being
popularized, a closely-related ﬁght over whether the state or federal sovereign
exercised an “eminent dominion” over possessions acquired by treaty was
briefed and decided by the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Holland.19 These
briefs are the ﬁnal exemplar of the vocabulary of eminent dominion that is
now purged from public law, and the Court’s decision remains a central
preoccupation of foreign-aﬀairs federalism.
18
19

136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016).
See Brief of Appellant, Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (No. 609).
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Taken together, the ﬁght over the eminent dominion and the victory of
imperialist bureaucrats illuminate the ways in which ideas about American
public law both bound and are bounded by partisanship. This history also
demonstrates a long-running and richly textured process by which the law of
nations was brought into domestic law. During this period, the boundary, so
to speak, between public and private law, and between American public law
and international public law, was especially porous. Accordingly, with respect
to the treaty-power questions taken up in Missouri v. Holland and revived once
again in Bond v. United States just six years ago, this history discloses a road
once taken and now almost entirely forgotten.
This purged constitutional history sheds an altogether diﬀerent light on
recurring questions about the federal government’s foreign-aﬀairs powers and
the peculiar status of the American sovereign’s title to acquired territory.
Indeed, the old debates are illuminating precisely because modern federal
courts, and especially the Supreme Court, have become distinctively
historicist when they make doctrinal choices in cases where foreign aﬀairs and
our federalism meet.20 To the extent these modern doctrinal choices assume
a constitutional history that speaks with one voice, they wager our public law
on risky foundations. If, indeed, some of our received constitutional histories
from the early-twentieth century were in fact motivated glosses—made in the
jaws of an imperial enterprise—the received history does not oﬀer a neutral
principle to settle our hard cases. History instead oﬀers familiar
constitutional politics dressed, by the victors, in the garb of inevitability. If
the apparent inevitability claimed by these histories represents, instead, utter
contingency—or worse, an imperial politics that modern minds might
abhor—it is important to see such contingency clearly, and to acknowledge
our acquiescence in it before building a modern public law upon it.
This Article demonstrates the imperial erasure of popular-sovereign
federalism from American foreign-aﬀairs law, and the modern consequences
of that erasure, in three Parts.
Part I sets the stage for the central nineteenth-century debates about
federal power to acquire and cede land. The theory that a dormant, popular
sovereign inherently limits the federal government’s foreign-aﬀairs powers
was still live and eﬀective in constraining politics during this period.
Moreover, this theory embraced a concept of civil power that interacted in
20 See infra Part III (discussing modern courts’ use of imperial constitutional histories in
resolving treaty-power and territories questions); see also Galbraith, supra note 11, at 62 (noting that
the treaty-power debate that has occupied the Court and scholars over the past two decades has
grown to “include substantial consideration of other principles of constitutional interpretation, most
notably the historical practice of the political branches and precedents based upon this practice”);
cf. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 525 (2014) (noting that “the longstanding ‘practice of the
government’ can inform our determination of ‘what the law is’” (citations omitted)).
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novel ways with the ambient international public law. Most conspicuously, in
insisting that the dual state and federal governments are ministerial agents of
the popular sovereign, federalism provided a vocabulary to resist the idea that
any American government could lay claim to a sovereign’s “eminent
dominion” from the law of nations. On this view, the eminent dominion—
that is, the private and public rights and powers called the eminent dominion
in the law of nations—and not an amorphous category of “domestic” or
“police” powers, was reserved from the national government’s treaty-making
power by the last clause of the Tenth Amendment.
Part II traces the opposing theories of dual-sovereign federalism and
popular-sovereign (or “dual-government”) federalism in the hands of
advocates with opposing views on the eminent dominion, as well as opposing
views on title to land acquired using that power. I argue that the battles
between these constitutional partisans yielded incommensurable outcomes
that remain suspended in contradiction in American foreign-aﬀairs law.
These battles were put to rest by the now-canonical constitutional histories
written to support our imperial government, but some artifacts of judicial
decisionmaking during the earlier period have lingered to become misleading
fodder for modern constitutional argument.
Part III first assesses the imperial reframing of foreign-affairs federalism
as a question of dual sovereignty. Here, I describe the influence that the old
eminent-dominion disputes about acquisition and cession exert upon modern
reasoning about the structural principles of our foreign-affairs public law. In
particular, I contend that popular-sovereign federalism and the fight over the
eminent dominion remained open questions at least until the last era of
imperial acquisition—an era that included Missouri v. Holland. At that time, in
response to considerable energy invested by constitutional historians, public
intellectuals, and courts, it finally became canonical that any and all sovereign
powers described by the law of nations were distributed between the federal
and state governments, not reserved to the popular sovereign. It thus became
natural to assert that (1) all powers exercised by other sovereigns must be
allocated to some American government; (2) those powers enabled an imperial
mode of government; and (3) the sovereign exercising those powers should
almost always be the federal government. As the most prominent
constitutional law professor wrote in 1899: “What Spain could do we can do.”21
Part III then proposes present-day extensions of the material unearthed
in the prior Parts. I ﬁrst take on the historical claims underlying several
Justices’ recent eﬀort in Bond v. United States to limit the federal government’s
foreign-aﬀairs powers by invoking the public law of the nineteenth century—
21 Letter from James Bradley Thayer to Moorﬁeld Storey 2 (Oct. 27, 1899) (on ﬁle with
Harvard Law School Historical and Special Collections).
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such as discerning a workable distinction between “domestic” and
“international” treaties.22 On the contrary, the approach the concurring
Justices advanced in Bond would actually yield no defensible principle that
attends to the modern structure of the American republic. Treaty-making in
the nineteenth-century republic was prone to exercises of power that were
quite municipally invasive. Treaties of acquisition and cession touched
concerns no less “domestic” than the composition of the federal union and
the lucrative title to public land composing the federal ﬁsc. For related
reasons, however, the dormant idea of popular-sovereign federalism oﬀers no
alternative: in part because of its fraught history and in part because of
methodological innovations in international (but not American) public law,
popular-sovereign federalism is now unimaginably implausible. The bell of
the imperial treaty-making power cannot be unrung.
By contrast, there are good reasons to reject the modern Supreme Court’s
parsing of this history in answering new questions about the imperial
territories’ political status. I argue that the Court’s recent attempt in Puerto
Rico v. Sanchez Valle to distinguish between the “sovereign” statuses of the
insular territories and the new (post-Founding) states is, by its own lights,
dubious. To the extent the “historical . . . wellsprings”23 of state sovereignty
are relevant to determining the status of territories acquired pursuant to
treaty, historical methods of constitutional interpretation suggest that the
new states’ claim to membership in the union was just as politically fraught
as that of the insular territories. Neither the structure of the Constitution nor
the nineteenth-century law of nations disclosed anything obvious about the
juridical status of either the new states or the insular possessions: their status
has from their inception been marked by bureaucrats’ conviction that our
imperialism was a fait accompli.
The Article concludes by resisting the thought that the old roads not taken
in our foreign-aﬀairs federalism should be revived. Some forgotten roads, as
with the popular-sovereign critique of the treaty-making power, cannot be
walked anew. Others, as with the political status of the insular possessions,
are so overdetermined by the fact of imperialism that modern courts should
reject historicist approaches altogether. I thus observe that the principal
lesson to be gleaned from the public law of prior eras is that the eﬀort to
revive the partisan federalisms of the past is no substitute for coming to
constitutional judgments by our own lights.

22 See Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 867-82 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (contending
that the federal government’s treaty-making power, properly understood, has always been limited to
issues of genuine international concern, such as international commerce, diplomacy, and war); id. at
882-96 (Thomas, J., concurring) (same); id. at 896-97 (Alito, J., concurring) (same).
23 Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1871.
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I. IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS
This Part describes the intellectual apparatus built by nineteenth-century
partisans to answer two public law disputes before the Marshall and Taney
Courts: the power to acquire and cede land, and title to land within the states.
Neither power is expressly granted to the federal government; both were the
objects of decades of sophisticated constitutional argument; and both caused
lawyers and courts to draw upon a law-of-nations canon to claim or disclaim
the marks, prerogatives, eminent powers, and majesties of sovereigns.
During this period our federalisms were plural, and the thought that the
people distributed all sovereign powers to their two governments—i.e., that
the Tenth Amendment stops at the comma following “reserved to the states”—
was not yet obvious. Indeed, neither the power to acquire nor the power to
convey title to land emerged from this period as a power reserved to the states,
as the modern reading of the Tenth Amendment might suggest. But the
conclusion that the federal government possesses some version of these powers
has served, for more than a century-and-a-half, as a stalking horse for broader
debates about the contours of American foreign-affairs federalism.
The claim that the treaty power implies the power to acquire and cede
territory, and the claim that the sovereignty of the federal government
permits it to convey title to public lands, continually recur in the intellectual
history of American federalism. Accordingly, the acquisition and cession
powers remain issues that, like many similar issues arising under the
Constitution’s sparse regulation of our governments’ foreign-aﬀairs powers,
“continue to cry for understanding.”24 The constitutional politics of this
period thus became the genesis of a permanent confusion in the theory of
American federalism. That is because to answer the puzzle of an implied
federal power to acquire and cede land, partisans and courts drew the law-ofnations language of eminent dominion into the American theory of
government and searched for a sovereign to which they could attach these
law-of-nations powers. The problems of acquisition, cession, and original title
to territory were thus all taken to ask a blended question of public
constitutional and international law: what is the eminent dominion and which
government can claim it?
The following Part describes these aged vocabularies of political thought,
which came together in the acquisition, cession, and title debates of the midto late-nineteenth century.

24

LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ix (2d ed. 1996).
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A. Sovereign Federalisms
Claims about American federalism are almost invariably inﬂected through
claims about the intellectual history of American sovereignty. Indeed, the
terms “sovereignty” and “government” are used more or less interchangeably
in the Supreme Court’s modern federalism jurisprudence.25 The
identiﬁcation of state and federal governments with “sovereignty” is so
dominant that a new generation of federalism scholarship aims to move
“beyond” sovereignty, with “dual” sovereignty as the point of departure.26
Yet, as explained in his recent Seeley lectures, Richard Tuck has called
attention to the “novelty” of the American idea that a “sovereign legislator”
called the People “has an institutional shape but is usually dormant.”27 By way
of example, the diﬀerence between the sovereign and its governments can be
perceived in widely quoted28 letters published during the ratiﬁcation debates.
The ﬁrst, Federalist 39, aimed to give comfort about the new Constitution by
explaining that “the proposed government cannot be deemed a national one;
since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves
to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other
objects.”29 The second, Federalist 46, was published two weeks later and
critiqued “gentlemen” who viewed the proposed state and federal
25 See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 542-43 (2013) (deriving, from the idea of
state sovereignty, a principle of “equal footing” that would limit the federal government’s power to
regulate voting); Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011) (“Federalism is more than an exercise
in setting the boundary between different institutions of government for their own integrity. ‘State
sovereignty is not just an end in itself: Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive
from the diffusion of sovereign power.’” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Northwest
Austin v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009) (“The Act also differentiates between the States, despite
our historic tradition that all the States enjoy ‘equal sovereignty.’” (citations omitted)); see also generally
Gregory Ablavsky, Empire States: The Coming of Dual Federalism, 128 YALE L.J. 1792 (2019) (critiquing
the modern Supreme Court’s “dual-sovereign” conceit and describing a history of American
federalism focused on the centralization of authority in the state and federal governments).
26 See Heather Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7, 44, 71
(2010) (urging both “nationalists” and “federalists” to “move beyond sovereignty”); see also Jessica
Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1259 (2009)
(analyzing states’ propensity to defy the federal government under the theory of federalism); Abbe
R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996 (2014) (emphasizing the role of states
notwithstanding Congress’s dominance in prevailing accounts of in U.S. federalism). An earlier
wave of scholarship following Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), similarly endeavored to
modernize the vocabulary of federalism so that it could move beyond “dual sovereignty” with, for
example, the idea of “autonomy.” See, e.g., Roderick Hills, State Autonomy, 96 MICH. L. REV. 815,
832-55 (1998) (critiquing the “modern doctrine of state autonomy” on the basis that the doctrine was
still tethered to notions of dual federalism).
27 RICHARD TUCK, THE SLEEPING SOVEREIGN 252 (2015).
28 Compare Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-19 (1997) (quoting THE FEDERALIST
NO. 39 (James Madison)), with Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1868) (quoting THE
FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison)).
29 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 256 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

944

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 931

governments “not only as mutual rivals and enemies, but as uncontrolled by
any common superior in their eﬀorts to usurp the authorities of each other.”30
Madison countered that “the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may
be found, resides in the people alone . . . .”31 These two letters frame a longvexed problem in deﬁning American federalism and describing how the
government should exercise civil power: in what sense is the state or federal
government “sovereign”—if at all?
In what follows, I argue that the principle that the “people” are the true
sovereign helps to explain the forgotten language of federalism that arose in
the debate over the federal government’s eminent dominion.
1. Federalism as a Contest of Sovereigns
Most court-authored explanations of “our federalism” embody a split-thebaby approach to the Constitution’s distribution of powers: the federal
government and the states are sovereign within their “spheres.” This “basic”
“dual federalism”32 theory ends at the last comma of the Tenth Amendment:
whatever powers are neither delegated to the federal government nor
prohibited to the states are reserved to the states (full stop).
On this theory, the special genius of the Constitution is that it “split the
atom”33 of sovereignty between—and only between—the federal government
and the states. “States are not mere political subdivisions of the United
States . . . . The Constitution . . . ‘leaves to the several States a residuary and
inviolable sovereignty,’ reserved explicitly . . . by the Tenth Amendment.”34
Thus, dual-sovereignty apportions sovereignty between the federal and state
governments, preserving the residual sovereignty of the latter.
The dual sovereignty thesis has had special traction in modern debates
about powers implied by the Constitution’s more capacious grants of civil
power, such as the treaty-making power or the Necessary and Proper Clause.35

THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 294 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Id.
See Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1950) (deﬁning
“dual federalism” as a national government reduced to enumerated powers, in tension with equally
sovereign state governments).
33 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
34 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at
245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
35 See Bradley, supra note 6, at 434-36 (examining the sources of the “purported immunity of the
treaty power from federalism limitations”); see also Corwin, supra note 32, at 17 (describing the “New
Court” of the New-Deal era as leaving “the Federal System . . . in ruins” by extracting a “latitudinarian
construction of the ‘necessary and proper’ clause” notwithstanding “the State Police Power”).
30
31
32
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Indeed, most contexts in which powers are said to inhere in “sovereignty”
usually incorporate some version of dual-sovereign federalism.36
2. Federalism as a Contest of Governments
Counterpoised to dual-sovereign federalism is the classical republican
view: in framing their Constitution, the people vested their sovereignty in
neither government. Instead, “the supreme, absolute and uncontrollable power
resides in the people at large; . . . they have vested certain proportions of this
power in the state governments; but . . . the fee-simple continues, resides and
remains, with the body of the people.”37 While the state governments are
“prominent features of the system,”38 in truth the Constitution commits to the
“original and supreme authority”39 of the people. The popular-sovereign view
of federalism reads the Tenth Amendment to its end: only the people may lay
claim to the full measure of sovereign prerogatives exercised by other nations.
The popular sovereign, even when dormant, thus has a juridical shape: the
popular sovereign reserves to itself those powers that remain un-delegated to
either the state or federal governments.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting—as the following pages will
demonstrate—that the popular-sovereign view of federalism does not tend to
an obvious ideological valence. On this contest-of-governments view of
American federalism, the placement of sovereignty in either government is
equally pernicious: a sovereign federal government is as odious as sovereign
states.40 Take, by way of example, the alignment between the politics and
constitutional theory of John Taylor of Caroline, Chief Justice Marshall’s
“most pertinacious critic.”41
Taylor argued for a popular-sovereign, dual-government theory of
federalism precisely to attack Chief Justice Marshall’s “heavy” federal
government.42 Taylor viewed sovereign states as anathema and urged
constitutional lawyers to be “vigilant custom-house oﬃcer[s]” to prevent a

36 See, e.g., Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1066-67 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(describing states’ power to regulate water use as “an essential attribute of [state] sovereignty” or
“pre-existing sovereign rights” (citation omitted)).
37 James Wilson, Speech (Dec. 4, 1787), reprinted in 4 AM. L.J. 359, 364 (1813).
38 Id. at 368.
39 Id. at 366.
40 See, e.g., Simeon Eben Baldwin, Lecture V (1899) (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with
Yale MSSA, Group 55, Series VI, Box 103, Folder 1088) (“This relation of the U.S. to the States
makes each of them always an imperium in imperio—a source of weakness & danger. We—the U.S.—
are more in danger from invasion of our rights by a State than by a foreign power. . . . No force can
be applied vs. a State. . . . We can only appeal to slow processes of suits in Gov’t . . . .”).
41 Corwin, supra note 32, at 7.
42 Id.
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foreign idea of sovereignty from invading American institutions.43 He
especially hated that the language of sovereignty had “crept into our political
dialect,” and sovereignty’s “unknown powers,” described in varied and
ambiguous ways in the law-of-nations literature, now “tickle[d] the mind” of
constitutional lawyers “with hopes and fears.”44 Instead, an “indeﬁnite word”
of sovereignty had become the “traitor of civil rights” and “transfer[ed]
sovereignty from the people . . . to their own servants.”45 In Taylor’s view,
“neither of the[] governments can legitimately acquire any species of
sovereignty at all, because it would be contrary to the conventional
sovereignty actually established.”46 The popular sovereign—neither the states
nor the federal government—is the true sovereign.
Taylor was also the most clear-eyed early theorist to identify the tendency
of his adversaries’ dual-sovereign brand of federalism to domesticate into
American law a set of public law principles loosely deﬁned by the law of
nations. In a passage that foreboded the constitutional battles that are the
focus of the remainder of this Article, Taylor criticized the tendency of those
who speak of “sovereignty” to use the “laws of nations” to make constitutional
arguments. He lambasted the “great ingenuity” of those who had used the
“formidable phalanx” of international law to enlarge the implied sovereign
powers of the people’s governments.47 The law of nations had been
conscripted to the “wicked design . . . of increasing domestick oppression” by
those who wished to argue that American “governments were invested with
sovereignty.”48 That “wicked design” would allow powers to be inferred from
the “powers of sovereignty,” until the people’s governments become
“unlimited” in their enumerated powers.49 Correctly understood, Taylor
argued, American federalism ensured that international lawyers could not
“ﬁnd a sovereignty to receive their bounty” in the United States—that is to
say, lawyers who would make use of sovereignty-oriented claims about
American public law could not identify a sovereign government to which lawof-nations theories of public law might apply.50
As I explain in the next Section, the now-defunct grammar of
constitutional argument that Taylor identiﬁed, and the mid-nineteenthcentury eﬀort that Taylor observed to domesticate the law of nations into
43 JOHN TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUED, AND CONSTITUTIONS VINDICATED 2
(Richmond, Shepherd & Pollard 1820).
44 Id. at 25.
45 Id. at 26.
46 Id. at 36.
47 Id. at 279.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 281.
50 Id. at 282.

2020]

The Imperial Treaty Power

947

American public law, are critical to understanding the ways in which
principles of federalism were embodied, extended, and eclipsed51 in the din
of nineteenth-century constitutional battles over land. This was a ﬁght over
which sovereign—state, federal, or popular—holds the eminent dominion. In
ﬁts and starts in the mid-nineteenth century, and then completely by the early
twentieth, American lawyers who aimed to acquire territory did in fact assign
the federal government a “sovereignty” to “receive the bounty” of the law of
nations.
B. “Receiving the Bounty” of the Law of Nations
A century after Taylor’s writing, the “unknown powers” provided by the
law of nations became central features of foreign-aﬀairs federalism. I consider
two: the conservation-of-powers thesis and the eminent dominion.
1. The Conservation-of-Powers Thesis
One important principle of modern constitutional law often travels with
dual-sovereign federalism, though less frequently with popular-sovereign
federalism. Call it the “conservation of powers” thesis.52 The conservationof-powers thesis advances the claim that “division of the sum total of
legislative powers between a ‘general government’, on the one hand, and the
‘States’, on the other” must be complete.53 On the conservation-of-powers
thesis, no plausible interpretation of the Constitution may leave a useful
sovereign power undistributed to at least one of the American governments.
The illustration of the conservation-of-powers thesis that is most
recognizable to modern debates was written by Senator George Sutherland,
who wrote in 1910 that
Vattel had written in 1758, and this [the framers] read: ‘Whatever is lawful
for one nation is equally lawful for another; and whatever is unjustiﬁable in
51 See Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas: The
Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 725-33 (2013) (describing the
growth of intellectual history in American constitutional history as an eﬀort to illuminate
constitutionalism outside of the courts, and to focus on “men and women thinking: making,
consuming, and remaking ideas and language” (quoting Daniel T. Rodgers, Thinking in Verbs, 18
INTELL. HIST. NEWSL. 21, 21-22 (1996)).
52 I name the thesis the “conservation of powers,” but I am far from the ﬁrst to notice the
constitutional argument. For more on the argument that powers not residing with the states must
reside in the federal government or not exist at all, see, for example, HENKIN, supra note 24, at 20;
Sarah H. Cleveland, The Plenary Power Background of Curtiss-Wright, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1127
(1999); G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA.
L. REV. 1, 5 (1999) (collecting examples of the argument that proving the absence of a power in the
states is suﬃcient to prove its presence in the federal government).
53 Corwin, supra note 32, at 3.
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the one is equally so in the other.’ With this knowledge [the framers]
introduced the United States of America into the family of nations, to be
governed by the law of nations.54

The claim that Sutherland, and others, was advancing in order to domesticate
the law of nations into American public law is worth defining with precision.
Although dual-sovereign federalism does not, strictly speaking, entail the
conservation of powers, the aﬃnity is clear enough: if the federal and state
governments are sovereigns within their spheres, and the state sovereign holds
the remainder of sovereignty, then the Constitution must have distributed
every conceivable power between the two governments (apart from those
expressly withheld by the Constitution’s text).
The conservation-of-powers thesis can do difficult work in making
arguments about the Constitution’s distribution of public power. Indeed, the
thesis supplied the following truism to a generation of constitutional lawyers:
“Under the constitution of the United States, all possible powers must be found
in the Union or the states, or else they remain among those reserved rights which
the people have retained, as not essential to be vested in any government.”55 This
imperative—to find all essential powers in our governments—can surmount even
the last clause of the Tenth Amendment: “[I]f that which is essential to
government is prohibited to one, it must, of necessity, be found in the other; and
the prohibition, in such case, on the one side, is equivalent to a grant on the
other.”56 The operative textual rule is thus: the express or implied denial of a
power to one government amounts to a grant to the other.
This 1865 description of the conservation-of-powers thesis is important
because its author, Judge James Valentine Campbell, taught Michigan’s
constitutional law course when George Sutherland received his training in
the law there.57 Sutherland would, as a Supreme Court Justice, come to

54 George Sutherland, The Internal and External Powers of the National Government, 191 N. AM.
REV. 373, 381 (1910).
55 Van Husan v. Kanouse, 13 Mich. 303, 312-13 (1865).
56 Id. at 313.
57 See Sutherland, supra note 54, at 386 (quoting Van Husan and describing Campbell as a jurist
“whose historical and legal learning has been seldom excelled in this country”); see also HADLEY
ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND 42-43 (1994) (explaining Campbell’s inﬂuence);
Marshall Davis Ewell, Notes Taken From Lectures Given by Ashley Pond and J.V. Campbell, 1866–
1868, at 7 (Dec. 17, 1866) [hereinafter Ewell’s Campbell Notes] (on ﬁle with Bentley Historical
Library, University of Michigan) (“The jurisdiction of the U.S. government is of three classes: ﬁrst
all external jurisdiction, second jurisdiction relative to all domestic matters relating to more than a
single state; third all matters that can not be safely intrusted to local jurisdiction without imperiling
the peace & harmony of the states.”). In light of the coronavirus pandemic, the editors were unable
to obtain a copy of the Ewell source to conﬁrm its contents before press.
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elevate Campbell’s theory into law.58 For Campbell and then for Sutherland,
American governments must “possess every power that has been found to be
absolutely necessary to all other nations.”59 No matter the interpretive
niceties, any theory of the Constitution must “portion[] out all the possible
powers to the general and state governments.”60
And indeed, as a Senator, Sutherland sharpened Campbell’s theory into a
thorough rejection of popular-sovereign federalism. He argued that “[t]o say
that the power is not destroyed but is reserved to the people does not meet the
difficulty. Such a reserved power is in effect no power. . . . A power reserved to
the people is not come-at-able; it cannot be translated into action.”61 Sutherland
thus rejected popular-sovereign federalism and its focus on the last clause of
the Tenth Amendment in defining the distribution of sovereignty within the
American republic: “We must assume that no necessary or beneficial power was
intentionally withheld . . . , but that the powers reserved to the people were
only such as they were capable or desirous of themselves exercising or were
unnecessary to the operations of government . . . .”62
In Sutherland’s hands, the conservation-of-powers thesis would become a
bedrock principle of a foreign-aﬀairs federalism that committed our
Constitution to a theory of dual sovereignty. From the idea that “the
consequence of denying to the general government any speciﬁed power over
external aﬀairs is to preclude its exercise by governmental agency altogether”63
one conclusion quickly followed: “all necessary power over external aﬀairs
should be vested in the National Government . . . .”64 In denying foreignaﬀairs powers to the states, Article I, Section 10, according to Sutherland’s
conservation-of-powers thesis, entails the plenary grant of that power to the
federal sovereign. The conservation-of-powers thesis has since become a
central feature of modern foreign-aﬀairs federalism.
Yet, as I have argued, views on the conservation-of-powers thesis were not
ﬁxed before Sutherland’s era. I focus in what follows on an especially knotty
question that drew partisans into warring about the popular-sovereign, dualsovereign, and conservation-of-powers ideas: do American governments
possess the eminent dominion?
58 See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 277 (2002) [hereinafter
Cleveland, Powers Inherent] (“Sutherland’s 1919 variation on [Judge Campbell’s] essay largely tracked
the same argument, though it asserted that the Territory Clause provided no power to govern territories
(e.g., the power must be inherent) and updated the argument to include the Insular Cases.”).
59 Ewell’s Campbell Notes, supra note 57, at 13 (emphasis added).
60 Id. (emphasis added).
61 Sutherland, supra note 54, at 380.
62 Id. at 381.
63 Id. at 375.
64 Id. at 378.
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2. The American Eminent Dominion
Like any serviceable property concept, the “eminent domain” entered
American law as a confused bundle of ideas, replete with a complex intellectual
history. Early constitutional reasoning about the eminent domain—or, as I
shall call the broader idea, the “eminent dominion”—was marked by a partisan
reception of the idea from a broad and vibrant law-of-nations literature.
For example, the nineteenth-century law student learned that the takings
power had to be borrowed from the law of nations because the state and
federal constitutions “do not gen[erally] . . . use the phrase ‘em. dom.’”65 The
term, as those students were taught, originated with the law-of-nations
publicist Grotius, “and imports supreme or ultimate property or control.”66
The last few words of Grotius’s description—“ultimate property or
control”—suggest the central conceptual diﬃculty (and consequent
opportunity) facing constitutional lawyers who wished to domesticate this
idea of the eminent dominion into American law. The idea deﬁned by Grotius
contained multitudes: in Grotius’s hands, the eminent domain describes both
a power over property and a right of dominion in that property.
Despite Grotius’s uncontroversial claim that the eminent dominion
includes a sovereign’s takings power,67 motivated readers of the law-of-nations
canon could pluck a number of disparate claims from his elaborate description
of the idea. First, Grotius’s rendition permitted partisans to use “eminent
domain” as a stand in for “power,” tout court. Sutherland’s favorite publicist
Vattel, for example, wrote that “when the nation takes possession of a country,
the property of certain things is [then] allowed to individuals only with th[e
sovereign’s] reserve [of eminent domain].”68 The people thus must
presumptively “yield[] to [the sovereign] the eminent domain.”69 Second,
because Grotius argued that the sovereign’s takings power ﬂowed from the
sovereign’s original property right, several publicists and constitutional

65 James Bradley Thayer, Lectures on Constitutional Law, at 100 (unpublished manuscript) (on
ﬁle with Harvard Law School Library).
66 Id. Thayer quoted Grotius in his seminal work on the eminent domain, arguing that a review
of the law of nations “will bring out the conceptions . . . which the framers of our ﬁrst constitutions
entertained” regarding the takings power. 1 JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, CASES ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 945 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1895).
67 See HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 1556 (Richard Tuck ed., Liberty
Fund 2005) (1625) (“[T]he State has an eminent Right of Property over the Goods of the Subjects,
so that the State, or those that represent it, may make Use of them, and even destroy and alienate
them, . . . for the publick Beneﬁt . . . .”).
68 M. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS: OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE;
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 173 (New York,
Samuel Campbell 1796).
69 Id. (emphasis omitted).
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lawyers thought that the eminent dominion was simply shorthand for a
sovereign’s exclusive control and jurisdiction over territory.70
Indeed, the title-oriented theory of the sovereign’s eminent dominion
recurred in the classic nineteenth-century treatments of title to territory in
public international law. Wheaton’s Elements of International Law, for example,
explained that “[t]his national proprietary right, so far as it excludes that of
other nations, is absolute; but in respect to the members of the state
it . . . forms what is called the eminent domain.”71 Similarly, when Thomas
Rutherforth delivered an inﬂuential course of lectures on public law, he
explained that “[a] n[a]tion by settling upon any tract of land, . . . acquires,
in respect of all other nations, an exclusive right of full or absolute
property . . . . This absolute property of a nation, in what it has thus seized
upon, is its right of territory.”72 And, by the late-nineteenth century, Thomas
Woolsey lectured his Yale students on the “Territorial Rights of States.” After
noting that “[a] nation exists within certain territory,” he likewise noted that
a nation “has jurisd[iction] over its subjects” and “has the domin. eminens.”73
Unlike his forebears, however, Woolsey rejected the idea that the “domin.
eminens” arose because “th[e] state was the original proprietor of the soil.”74
Instead, Woolsey would argue that the “true” justiﬁcation for the “domin.
eminens” is the more familiar idea that “there are rights of all which aﬀect
land” that might overcome any individual proprietor’s rights.75 Just a few
moments later, however, Woolsey’s lecture contended that “a govt [sic] may
not sell or give away its subjects prop. or even alienate a part of territory
without the inhabitants consent.” 76
I highlight Woolsey’s limitation of the sovereign’s prerogative to cede
territory for two reasons. It not only underscores the extent to which
sovereignty, takings, and cession were all closely related aspects of the
eminent dominion,77 but it also demonstrates the extent to which Americans
70 See, e.g., Beekman v. Saratoga & Schenectady R.R., 3 Paige Ch. 45, 73 (N.Y. Ch. 1831) (“[T]he
eminent domain, the highest and most exact idea of property, remains in the government, or in the
aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity . . . .”); Lindsay v. East Bay St. Comm’rs, 1
S.C.L. (1 Bay) 38, 56 (S.C. 1796) (recognizing how “eminent civilians and jurists” interpret the
power to “appropriate a portion of the soil of every country for public roads and highways” as part
of “the original rights of sovereignty” within “the authority of the state”).
71 HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 137 (Philadelphia, Carey, Lea &
Blanchard 1836) (emphasis omitted).
72 2 THOMAS RUTHERFORTH, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAW 455 (Philadelphia, William
Young 1799).
73 Thomas D. Woolsey, Woolsey Family Papers A (unpublished lecture notes) (on ﬁle with
Yale MSSA, Group 562, Series II, Box 45, No 193).
74 Id.
75 Id. at B.
76 Id.
77 RUTHERFORTH, supra note 72, at 456-57.
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inherited the entirety of these confused deﬁnitions of the eminent dominion
from the law-of-nations canon.
The confusion surrounding the eminent dominion’s conﬂated treatment
of a sovereign’s takings power with original title was excellent fodder for
constitutional politics.
Indeed, the limitation that Woolsey conveyed to his students—that
republics may not barter territory without the inhabitants’ consent—
encapsulated a hard-fought dispute about the treaty power that has now
vanished from the constitutional canon. As Woolsey’s lectures suggest, a
critical U.S. public law dispute about the power to exchange territory with
other sovereigns caused partisans to mobilize the law-of-nations idea of the
eminent dominion.78 That is because some publicists in the law-of-nations
canon, such as Grotius, considered the acquisition and cession powers to
follow from the eminent dominion, and sometimes concluded that sovereigns
lack the power to cede their territory to other sovereigns without the consent
of the ceded “part.”79 Grotius was certain of this limit because he thought that
the compacts that create governments could “never be reasonably imagined
to . . . invest the Body with a Power to cut oﬀ its own Members whenever it
pleases, and to subject them to the Dominion of another.”80 On the other
hand, several later publicists, such as Vattel, argued that when it came to “the
cession of a town or province,” the nation “has a right to cut them oﬀ from
the body[ i]f the public safety requires it.”81 For Vattel, “the cession ought to
remain valid as to the state, since it hath a right to make it . . . .”82 In short,
the sovereign’s eminent dominion included original title, permitting the
sovereign to get and spend territory at will.
The mid-nineteenth-century student at Harvard Law School was assigned
all of these materials—Grotius, Vattel, and Rutherforth—as core texts in the
“Law of Nations” and left to puzzle over the definition of the “eminent
domain”—an idea that would become a significant focus of American public
law in the century that followed.83 The first clear-eyed American treatment of
the eminent dominion was thus written by a young Harvard law student
named James Bradley Thayer in 1856. When Thayer finished law school in

78 See infra Section II.B (describing the use of “eminent domain” to mean sovereign’s title in
mid-nineteenth-century public land debates).
79 GROTIUS, supra note 67, at 1554 (accepting that in “[c]ase[s] of extreme Necessity,” a part of a state
may sever itself “because it is probable that Power was reserved, when civil Societies were instituted”).
80 Id. at 569.
81 VATTEL, supra note 68, at 179-80.
82 Id. at 180.
83 See generally WILLIAM WOODWARD, A CATALOGUE OF THE LAW LIBRARY OF HARVARD
UNIVERSITY IN CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS (Cambridge, Folsom, Wells & Thurston 1841).
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1856, a prominent Boston lawyer heralded his entry to the bar by publishing
his Harvard prize essay called “The Right of Eminent Domain.”84
Remarkably, Thayer devoted much of his first scholarly publication to
explaining what the eminent domain is not. The eminent domain is not, he
cautioned, “the right of sovereign power in general”; nor is it the literal
“domain” of public land; nor is it the power of taxation; nor is it the regulation
of property; nor is it the law of necessity in the sense contemplated by the law
of private property.85 Indeed, for Thayer, the eminent dominion was not an
abstract “right of property” at all: “although Grotius originated the name, yet
he did not originate that for which the name stands . . . .”86 Eminent domain
simply stands for the “taking [of] private property for public purposes.”87
Thayer would argue for more than ﬁfty years that the title-oriented idea
of the sovereign’s eminent dominion was “petty.”88 But the equivalence
between “takings” and “eminent domain” was not as crisply ﬁxed as Thayer
would have liked. As I shall now explain, the other meanings of the eminent
dominion instead became a central situs of constitutional conﬂict in the midnineteenth through mid-twentieth century.
II. FEDERALISM AND THE SOVEREIGN’S EMINENT DOMINION
Having explained the ideological origins of the eminent dominion, and
having described the warring ideas of dual-sovereign federalism, popularsovereign federalism, and the conservation-of-powers thesis, I now turn to
the constitutional battles over whether any American government could
exercise a broad “eminent dominion” by treaty. As I have noted and will
explain in the last Part of this Article, this history was excised from canonical
histories of the treaty power in the early-twentieth century, in order to
practice cleanly an imperial government.
James Bradley Thayer, Note, The Right of Eminent Domain, 19 MONTHLY L. REP. 241 (1856).
Id. at 244-46.
Id. at 246.
Id. at 247. John Lewis advanced the same argument decades later. See 1 JOHN LEWIS, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (Chicago, Callaghan &
Co. 1888) (“All other exercises of power over private property . . . may properly be referred . . . to
some other of the sovereign powers of the State. Therefore eminent domain is properly limited in
its application to the appropriation by a sovereign State of private property to particular uses, as the
public welfare demands.”); see also William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings
Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 799 (1995) (highlighting Lewis’s declaration
that the Takings Clause applied not only to the deprivation of physical things, but also to the
deprivation of “certain rights in and appurtenant to those things”).
88 James Bradley Thayer, Book Review, 8 HARV. L. REV. 237 (1894); see also 1 PHILIP
NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 24 nn.47-51 (2d ed. 1917) (surveying the nineteenthcentury confusion); cf. Letter from Carman Randolph to James Bradley Thayer (July 1, 1894) (on
ﬁle with Harvard Law School Special Collections) (“[Y]ou know better than most . . . how many
mistakes have been made in deﬁning [the eminent domain].”).
84
85
86
87
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From 1825 to 1850, the American political elite debated two related
constitutional puzzles: the ﬁrst-order question of whether any government
possesses the power to acquire and cede territory; and the second-order
question of whether the federal government or the states hold original title
to land so acquired.
These disputes demanded answers to mixed questions of private and
public law, and so they drew out careful reasoning from the partisans who
debated their answers. The stakes were also high: “All together this public
domain represented a vast reservoir of potential national wealth and provided
a crucial outlet for the growth of the American population.”89 And, because
these disputes are largely settled, they reveal something about the history of
our constitutional culture while being less prone to revelatory vindications of
modern political intuitions.
A small vignette illustrates the extent to which these issues were conjoined
in constitutional politics: In March 1837, former Chancellor James Kent
invited Daniel Webster to New York City to give a public address. Webster
arrived in New York on March 15, 1837, where over two-and-a-half hours he
discussed hallmark issues of nineteenth-century politics: slavery, the national
bank, paper money, internal improvements, and the presidency.90 But much of
his speech was dedicated to the annexation and cession of foreign land, and
the government’s title to such lands once acquired.91 On these last questions,
Webster ably defended the views of his party. He argued that the annexation
of Texas by treaty would be unconstitutional.92 He also acknowledged the
existence of “[t]he idea, that when a new State is created, the public lands lying
within her . . . become [her] property . . . in consequence of her sovereignty”
but rejected it as “too preposterous for serious refutation.”93
Yet Webster’s sweeping rejection of annexation and the new states’ title
suggests that the positions he was assailing were not so preposterous as to
pass without mention. Indeed, Webster’s speech assumed a partisan posture
on central constitutional battles that left an enduring imprint on our foreignaﬀairs federalism. Fifty years later, the power to annex was ﬁnally accepted
as a fait accompli; the title to territory acquired by such acquisition was ﬁrmly
vested in the federal government (though the U.S. Reports still bear the scars
of litigation connected to that settlement); and the power to cede territory
was denied to the federal government.94
Jerry Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists, 116 YALE L. J. 1636, 1696 (2007).
Senator Daniel Webster, Speech at Niblo’s Saloon in New York: We Have One Country—
One Constitution—One Destiny 1-2 (Mar. 15, 1837).
91 Id. at 11-12.
92 Id. at 11.
93 Id. at 7.
94 See infra Section II.A.
89
90
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By accounting for Webster’s victories and losses, we can get some purchase
on the peculiar constitutional history that the mid-nineteenth century
furnished to the twentieth. That is to say, we can understand what Justice
Holmes would come to obliquely criticize as an “invisible radiation from the
general terms of the Tenth Amendment” in Missouri v. Holland,95 and what
Justices Scalia and Thomas would later critique as “[a]n unreasoned and
citation-less sentence” in the Court’s seminal discussion of the limits of the
American government’s treaty power.96 As I shall argue in the concluding Part
of this Article, reviving these mid-nineteenth-century contests also draws into
view the early-twentieth-century effort to shore up an imperial power to
acquire territory and to maintain it as the dominion of the federal sovereign.
A. Acquisitions and Cessions
The legal history of the powers of acquisition and cession is well settled.
First, despite his initial scruples about whether a federal acquisition power
was consistent with “strict construction,” Thomas Jeﬀerson accomplished the
Louisiana Purchase.97 Second, the Marshall Court took up the acquisition
power twenty-ﬁve years later in American Insurance v. Canter.98 Marshall
agreed with counsel’s argument in that case that although the “express terms”
of the Constitution do not contemplate acquisition, the power could be
derived from the “universal principles of general law; from the powers of
making peace, and war, and of making treaties, etc.”99 Marshall thus
sanctioned Jeﬀerson’s purchase by holding that the power to acquire territory
is a “consequen[ce]” of the federal government’s treaty or war-making
powers.100 Marshall, it is thought, “entirely put to rest” the “power to acquire
territory by treaty.”101 Finally, the acquisition of Texas enlarged the power by
allowing annexation by mere joint resolution.
The above-recited history evinces a fair measure of victor’s justice, both
domestic and imperial. Viewing the history of acquisition in this way suﬀers
from three critical ﬂaws.
The ﬁrst ﬂaw is that Jeﬀerson’s misgivings were unknown for the ﬁrst few
decades of the nineteenth century and were not public when Marshall decided
Canter. Jeﬀerson’s skepticism entered the vernacular of popular constitutional
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 873 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring).
See, e.g., EVERETT SOMERVILLE BROWN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
LOUISIANA PURCHASE, 1803–1812, at 28 (1920); 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 160 n.1 (Boston, Little & Brown 1851).
98 See Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 524 (1828).
99 Id.
100 Id. at 542.
101 Golove, supra note 6, at 1190 n.357.
95
96
97
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argument thirty years later. At that point, Jeﬀerson’s reservations became a
cudgel of hypocrisy with which people like Joseph Story could beat strict
constructionists.102 Because Jeﬀerson’s constitutional scruples entered the
debate so late, in order to understand the annexation problem and its
resolution, one must look to the political era in which the issue was genuinely
debated—that is, the decades after Canter was decided.
The second problem with the prevailing history of the acquisition power
is that Marshall’s quick pronouncement in Canter that there was a consequent
power to acquire territory was easily distinguished in the decades that
followed. As described in more detail below, as the acquisition of Texas moved
to the fore of constitutional debate, inﬂuential opponents of the acquisition
power dismissed Canter as dicta or distinguished Canter as inapplicable to
anything but the territory of Louisiana.103 In short, Canter settles the
acquisition question only to the eyes of the modern lawyer who is committed
to the historical ﬁdelity of the U.S. Reports.104
But the most important flaw in the orthodox history of territorial
acquisition is that it expunges the most sophisticated fights over the treaty
power’s reach from the American constitutional narrative. The annexation
question, which turned on the propriety of drawing the eminent dominion
into American public law, remained open to dispute to the end of the
nineteenth century. Indeed, the question remained so unsettled as to permit a
national partisan fight over acquiring Texas, and it remained an open question
in the twentieth century with respect to the propriety of imperial government.
1. Acquiring Louisiana and Texas
The orthodox history of the acquisition power was written by Everett
Brown, whose 1920 Ph.D. dissertation entitled “The Constitutional History
of the Louisiana Purchase” collected Jeﬀerson’s skeptical thoughts about
acquisition in a chapter describing the “contemporary opinion” of the
“constitutional right to acquire territory.”105 Today, Brown’s history
102 See, e.g., STORY, supra note 97, at 160 n.1 (“President Jeﬀerson himself . . . was of the
opinion that the measure was unconstitutional . . . . What a latitude of interpretation is this! The
constitution may be overleaped, and a broad construction adopted for favorite measures . . . !”).
103 See, e.g., COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., REPORT ON THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS TO
THE UNITED STATES, S. 50, at 19 (1838) (“[T]he power exercised in the case of Louisiana, and that
which is proposed to be exercised in the admission of Texas . . . are distinct in their character, and
depend upon entirely diﬀerent principles.”).
104 See Mark A. Graber, Settling the West: The Annexation of Texas, the Louisiana Purchase, and
Bush v. Gore, in SANFORD LEVINSON ET AL., THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND AMERICAN
EXPANSION, 1803–1898, at 84 (2005) (“Eﬀorts to analogize the process by which the West was
settled to the processes by which the constitutional questions that occupy much contemporary
scholarship are settled risks embroiling American constitutionalism in a vicious circle.”).
105 BROWN, supra note 97, at 14-35.
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underwrites nearly all the major general and specialist histories of the
constitutionality of acquisition.106
As Brown’s history argued, Jefferson had concluded that the Constitution
would have to be amended to authorize the acquisition of Louisiana. Some in
Jefferson’s cabinet tried to square an acquisition power with the Constitution’s
text; others resisted.107 Ultimately, Brown wrote, Jefferson swallowed his doubts:
Although Jefferson was convinced that “[t]he Executive . . . ha[s] done an act
beyond the Constitution,” it would be up to later generations to judge his
choice.108 When that generation comes of age, an “act of indemnity will confirm
and not weaken the Constitution, by more strongly marking out its lines.”109
Brown’s notion was that Jeﬀerson was, with a heavy heart, transgressing
the Constitution for the good of the country—he “risk[ed him]self for you.”110
That conceit dovetailed with widespread contemporary public approval of the
Louisiana Purchase. A young Joseph Story, for example, recommended that
Massachusetts vote to approve the purchase.111 An even younger Daniel
Webster praised the purchase in a senior declamation at Dartmouth.112
Crucially, Jeﬀerson’s misgivings were not known outside his circle of
conﬁdants and played no role in the early settlement of the acquisition
question. A diplomatic history published in the same year as Jeﬀerson’s death,
for example, makes no mention of Jeﬀerson’s critique, describing instead an
unremarkable incorporation of Louisiana following the “surrender of the
province . . . in the usual form.”113
To be sure, the conclusion that Jeﬀerson’s acquisition accomplished an “act
beyond the Constitution”114 did eventually enter popular constitutional
politics, but only after Canter was decided. Canter brought the uncertain
constitutional basis for acquisition into focus to those who resisted further
106 See, e.g., PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 155
n.92 (7th ed. 2018) (referring to Brown’s treatment of the history of the Louisiana Purchase);
Cleveland, Powers Inherent, supra note 58, at 167-71 (repeatedly citing Brown’s history in a discussion
of the history of the Louisiana Purchase).
107 See BROWN, supra note 97, at 20, 31 (noting that “[Secretary of State] Madison answered that
‘he did not know that it was universally agreed that it required an amendment’” and that Secretary of
the Treasury Gallatin “could see no difference ‘between a power to acquire territory for the United
States and the power to extend by treaty the territory of the United States’” (citation omitted)).
108 Id. at 25 (citation omitted).
109 Id. (citation omitted).
110 Id. (citation omitted).
111 See Letter from Jacob Crowninshield to Joseph Story (Feb. 13, 1804) (on ﬁle with University
of Michigan Archives).
112 See Daniel Webster, Would it be Advantageous to the United States to Extend Their Territories?
(Dec. 25, 1800), in 11 PROC. MASS. HIST. SOC’Y 329-330 (1870) (“[W]e are under necessity of
extending our territories by possessing ourselves of all the country adjacent those rivers, necessary
for our commerce, or of giving up the idea of ever seeing Western America a ﬂourishing country.”).
113 THEODORE LYMAN, THE DIPLOMACY OF THE UNITED STATES 113 (Boston, Wells & Lily 1826).
114 BROWN, supra note 97, at 25 (citation omitted).
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acquisitions. By then, the principal resistors were two men who had once
supported the acquisition of Louisiana—Joseph Story (since elevated to the
Supreme Court) and Daniel Webster—and a prominent abolitionist named
William Ellery Channing. These three participated in the creation of a widely
circulated set of documents that resisted the acquisition of Texas on
constitutional grounds. They nearly won.
Channing’s contribution to the Texas debate started with a series of letters
to his classmates.115 Channing intended to oppose publicly the annexation of
Texas to staunch the spread of slavery.116 He asked a friend to help him canvass
the constitutional objections, who in turn forwarded the request to Justice Joseph
Story.117 Story replied from Washington by explaining that the relevant points
of constitutional law were “much discussed in the debates on the Louisiana
Treaty in 1803, which were collected in a volume (which I have) printed in
1804.”118 Story admitted that he agreed with Marshall’s holding in Canter that
the federal government could acquire territory, but added that is a “very
different question from the point whether a foreign State, as such, is admissible
into the Union.”119 On that question, Story could not “see any ground, upon
which Texas, as an independent state, is admissible into the union.”120
Story oﬀered to send his own copy of the 1804 debates to aid Channing’s
argument against Texas.121 This copy is preserved in Harvard Law School’s
library,122 and is marked up by someone eager to contest the constitutionality
of acquisition. Nearly all of the ﬂoor speeches opposing the acquisition of
Louisiana are highlighted. For example, the argument by one congressman
that the “power to incorporate new territory did not exist” is highlighted in
the margin.123 The speaker argued that annexation would allow the Senate
and the Executive to “add to the numbers of the union by treaty whenever
they please” and “destroy[] the perfect union contemplated between the
original parties, by interposing an alien . . . to share the powers of
government with them.”124
115 See Fulmer Mood & Granville Hicks, Letters to Dr. Channing on Slavery and the Annexation
of Texas, 1837, in 5 NEW ENGL. Q. 587, 587 (1932) (describing the correspondence between
classmates); Russell K. Osgood, Book Review, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 726, 730 (1986) (noting that
Story and Channing were classmates).
116 Mood & Hicks, supra note 115, at 587.
117 Id. at 587-88 (describing Channing’s correspondence with Joseph Tuckerman and Joseph Story).
118 Id. at 593 (footnote omitted).
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 594.
122 See DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON THE BILL FOR CARRYING INTO
EFFECT THE LOUISIANA TREATY (Philadelphia, Thomas & George Palmer 1804) (on ﬁle with
Harvard Law School Library) (signed by Joseph Story).
123 Id. at 62.
124 Id. at 102-03.
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Channing used the material gleaned from Story’s volume to write an open
letter opposing annexation. “The annexation of Texas,” he predicted, “will
give rise to constitutional questions and conﬂicts, which cannot be
adjusted.”125 Although the North agreed to annex Louisiana “very reluctantly,
on account of [its] obvious utility,” Channing argued that the proposed
annexation of Texas would unlawfully “admit an independent community,
invested with sovereignty, into the confederation.”126 Channing then asked a
series of rhetorical questions: “can the treaty-making power do this? Can [the
treaty-making power] receive foreign nations, however vast, to the Union?”127
And ﬁnally, “Does not the question carry its own answer?”128
Many Northerners answered Channing’s questions. One history reports
that 182,400 citizens petitioned the House to oppose the annexation of
Texas.129 Chief among them was a brief of the Massachusetts legislature,
which neatly elaborated the popular-sovereign theory that federalism
prohibited any exercise of the treaty-making power that altered the
composition of the popular sovereign.
Massachusetts argued that no arm of the federal government has the
“competency” to acquire Texas and contended that annexation “can only be
accomplished by the exercise of the reserved sovereignty of the people.”130
Indeed, the government could not accomplish annexation without adopting
“another frame of government radically diﬀerent, in objects, principles and
powers from that which was framed for our own self-government, and
deemed to be adequate to all the exigences of our own free Republic.”131 A
power to annex cannot be “incidental to the general nature of our
government,” Massachusetts argued, because “all and each have a right to say
with whom they will or will not be connected.”132 And, if Louisiana was taken
to be an analogous precedent, Massachusetts had a ready answer: “The
posthumous publication of [Jeﬀerson’s] writings [in 1829] has fully disclosed
that Jeﬀerson himself believed . . . that his own acts . . . were not authorized
by the constitution, but that they implied the exercise of a power forbidden
by its spirit . . . .”133 If even Jeﬀerson had rejected the Louisiana Purchase,
Massachusetts contended, then the purchase was no precedent at all.
125 WILLIAM ELLERY CHANNING, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF W.E. CHANNING 639,
(London, Routledge & Sons 1873).
126 Id. at 639-40.
127 Id. at 640.
128 Id.
129 AUSTIN WILLEY, THE HISTORY OF THE ANTISLAVERY CAUSE IN STATE AND NATION
83 (Portland, Thurston & Co. 1886).
130 COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., supra note 103, at 4.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 8.
133 Id. at 17-18.
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In Massachusetts’s view, the treaty power was not unlimited. To find its
extent, one should “look for its nature and limits . . . to the law of nations,
except so far as it may be restrained by other provisions of the constitution
itself.”134 One cardinal limitation furnished by the law of nations,
Massachusetts argued, is that the treaty-making power cannot affect things
that “belong inalienably to the people, and . . . cannot be[] delegated by them
to their governments.”135 Treaties could settle boundaries or exchange
“dependencies” that are “the mere property of the Prince,” but treaties could
not transfer the “principal empire”—the eminent dominion—of the state.136
Massachusetts then canvassed the eminent-domain writings of Vattel, Samuel
Puffendorf, and Grotius to shore up the argument that the “disposition
of . . . sovereignty” cannot be “a subject of barter by governments.”137 (The
emphasis in these passages is in the original: a people’s government cannot
barter away the people’s sovereignty—their eminent dominion—to other
sovereigns.) So, Texas could not give itself to us, and we could not receive it.138
Crucially, Massachusetts argued, the union of a foreign sovereignty with
our government can only be “eﬀected by the summa jus, the highest rights of
reserved sovereignty. It must be the act of the people themselves, and not of
their rulers and servants.”139
The Senate rejected the acquisition of Texas by treaty, spurring
proponents of annexation to begin a new eﬀort to acquire Texas by ordinary
legislation. With a new sense of alarm, on January 26, 1845, Daniel Webster
summoned two local lawyers to his Boston oﬃce.140 As he paced the room,
Webster dictated one ﬁnal argument to oppose the annexation of Texas.141
The question, Webster argued, “touches the identity of the Republic” and
presents a “plain violation of the Constitution.”142 Like Channing and the
Massachusetts legislature, Webster argued that no member of Congress is
“clothed with any such authority” to modify the union.143 Nor would the state
legislatures have such power. Like the consent required to form the union,
the “assent was given, not by the Legislature, but by a Convention of
Delegates, chosen directly by the people . . . and with authority, therefore, to
bind the people in a manner to which no other representative body was

134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

Id. at 21.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id. at 24 (emphasis omitted).
15 WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF DANIEL WEBSTER 192 n.1 (1903).
Id.
Id. at 194-95.
Id. at 198.
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competent.”144 Annexation of foreign states would thus require higher-order
lawmaking145 by the dormant popular sovereign—no representative
government was competent to exercise the sovereign people’s eminent
dominion whether by treaty or otherwise. So here was Massachusetts’s fully
formed popular-sovereign federalism: even if annexation is part of some
sovereigns’ treaty-making power, the American sovereign delegated that
power to neither of its governments. Massachusetts thus elaborated a vision
of American foreign-aﬀairs federalism that required no theory of “state
sovereignty” to limit the treaty power.
Yet Massachusetts lost. Congress voted to annex Texas on March 1, 1845 and
to admit Texas on December 29, 1845.146 The joint resolutions carried simple
majorities in both houses.147 Although Massachusetts generated a plausible
critique of annexation, politics overbore high ideals. The election of a President—
James K. Polk—who favored annexation148 would become, in the gloss of the
imperial histories written at the turn of the next century, a constitutional moment
that enlarged the treaty power by placing the issue on the ballot.
The constitutional debate over the power to annex Texas is now consigned
to a long footnote in the constitutional history of Texas.149 Yet the resolution
of the Texas question represented the ﬁrst, highly contingent eﬀort to deﬁne
a canonical view of the annexation power received from the eminent
dominion. For the ﬁrst time, the fact that Jeﬀerson thought that acquisition
was unconstitutional entered public debate. And partly as a consequence of
that timing, Marshall’s view of the treaty-making power elaborated in Canter
did not settle the question. In short, the annexation power could not be
clothed in “our federalism” or resolved by invoking the founders’ meaning
recovered from time out of mind.
But politics did not vanquish Massachusetts’s argument for good. After all,
there were two other eminent-dominion debates still to be resolved: the power
to cede territory and the right of title over territory acquired from others.
2. Maine’s Pride of Dominion
Just as a treaty controversy sparked the constitutional upheaval over
Texas, a treaty motivated the contest over the federal government’s power to
cede territory. Today, as Justice Thomas recently demonstrated, it is possible
Id.
Id. at 201.
5 STAT. 797-98 (annexing Texas), 9 STAT. 108 (admitting Texas as a state).
A. RAY STEPHENS, TEXAS: A HISTORICAL ATLAS 124, 127 (2010) (showing breakdown of votes).
See EUGENE IRVING MCCORMAC, JAMES K. POLK: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 226-27
(1922) (summarizing Polk’s support of “re-annexing” Texas).
149 See, e.g., JUSTIN H. SMITH, THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 328 n.11 (1911) (describing the
relevant history in a footnote spanning four pages).
144
145
146
147
148
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to draw from the Federalist Papers the contention that “[t]he President and
Senate lacked the power ‘to dismember the empire.’”150 But, as the second
generation of constitutional lawyers would discover, the generalities of the
Federalist Papers gave way to the realities of international life. Maine’s
northern boundary produced the constitutional contest.
The northeast boundary of the United States was ostensibly ﬁxed in 1783
by the Treaty of Peace that ended the Revolutionary War.151 Accordingly, the
territory which included Maine was to be a “free, sovereign and independent”
state, whose boundary, in pertinent part, was to run along “Highlands which
divide those rivers that empty themselves into the River St. Lawrence.”152 As
was apparent to the drafters, the treaty’s incorporation of a boundary line
running through “Highlands” was ambiguous.153
The highland boundary became mired in decades of arbitration and the
object of a hard-fought constitutional debate. By the end of the War of 1812,
confusion over Maine’s highland boundary entered its fourth decade. A new
treaty of peace referred the boundary dispute to arbitration.154
While arbitration negotiations were unfolding, Maine—since made a state
independent from Massachusetts—loudly resisted any arbitration of its
border with Canada. Governor Enoch Lincoln used his inaugural address to
call upon Maine to be “tenacious of its territorial possessions,” and sketched
out a view of the eminent dominion that would develop into a rallying cry
over the following decade.155
Lincoln told his legislature that “we have no reason to believe that the
right or disposition anywhere exists to cede our soil, . . . which would be an
abuse in which neither the people nor the governments of the Union or the
States would acquiesce.”156 He conﬁdently predicted that “our inalienable

150 Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 888 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing 3 DEBATES
ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 514 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1876)).
151 Deﬁnitive Treaty of Peace, Gr. Brit.-U.S., Sept. 3, 1783, 18 Stat. 266-69.
152 Id. at 266-67.
153 See 1 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 98 (Washington, Gov’t

Printing Oﬀ. 1898) (providing that the highland line would be resolved “as soon as
conveniently . . . after the war” (citing 5 FRANCIS WHARTON, THE REVOLUTIONARY
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 808 (Washington, Gov’t Printing Oﬀ.
1889))); President Jeﬀerson’s Third Annual Message to Congress (Oct. 17, 1803), reprinted in 1
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 62 (1833) (noting that the Maine boundary was
“too imperfectly described to be susceptible to execution”).
154 Treaty of Ghent, Gr. Brit.-U.S., art. V, Dec. 24, 1814, 8 Stat. 218 (referring the “Highlands”
boundary first to commissioners, but in the alternative to binding arbitration by a “friendly sovereign”).
155 Israel Washburn, Jr., The North-Eastern Boundary, in 8 COLLECTIONS OF THE MAINE
HISTORICAL SOCIETY 31 (Portland, Hoyt, Fogg & Donham 1881).
156 Id.

2020]

The Imperial Treaty Power

963

sovereignty will be respected.”157 Lincoln then wrote to Secretary of State
Henry Clay, holding himself out as “the only organ of communication of the
people of Maine.”158 His letter introduced a remarkable contention, which
remains underscored in pencil in the State Department archives: “[n]either
the treaty making or executive power of the United States extends to the
cession or exchange of the territory of any State, without its consent.”159
Maine’s constitutional argument to the State Department was that “neither
department of the Federal Government, nor all [federal departments], can be
the . . . arbiter . . . of a boundary already established . . . because, if one
department, or all, have this power, they may . . . indirectly cede our State.”160
The following month, Lincoln wrote to President John Quincy Adams to
inquire about a “rumor” he had heard that the United States was referring the
boundary to arbitration.161 Although, he wrote, the “treaty making
power . . . engage[s] to consider the decision of the Arbitrator
conclusive . . . there is another party, not to be an indifferent spectator to its own
delaceration.”162 Secretary Clay replied and disclosed that the boundary would,
indeed, be referred to an arbitrator.163
Lincoln once again addressed Maine’s legislature to decry the forthcoming
arbitration. He contended that the effort to arbitrate the boundary “is to
pronounce the State unfit for self-government . . . . Even the privilege of
being able to give [the territory] away is worth more than . . . the richest mine
of gold.”164 Lincoln asked whether the treaty-making power could “exercise a
function beyond the grasp of the delegated power over the whole” and, with
the complicity of a foreign sovereign arbitrator, “do what it could not
accomplish without; that is, consent to the alienation . . . of territo[r]y.”165
Lincoln’s theory of the eminent dominion—of soil, territory, exclusive
possession, and sovereignty—was entirely lifted from the law-of-nations
canon. Lincoln thus asked the assembled legislature whether “the United
States [has] any constitutional authority to cede any part of an independent
Id.
Letter from Enoch Lincoln, Governor of Me., to Henry Clay, U.S. Sec’y of State (Apr. 18,
1827), in 326 U.S. CONGRESSIONAL SERIAL SET 150 (1838).
159 Id. at 151.
160 Id. at 153.
161 Letter from Enoch Lincoln, Governor of Me., to John Quincy Adams, U.S. President (May
29, 1827), in RESOLVES OF THE EIGHTH LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF MAINE 751 (Portland,
Thomas Todd 1828) [hereinafter RESOLVES].
162 Id. at 752.
163 Letter from Henry Clay, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Enoch Lincoln, Governor of Me. (Nov. 10,
1827), in 6 PAPERS OF HENRY CLAY 1251 (Mary W. M. Hargreaves & James F. Hopkins eds., 1981).
164 Enoch Lincoln, Governor of Me., Speech to Both Houses of the Legislature (Jan. 3, 1828),
in RESOLVES, supra note 161, at 621.
165 Id. Enoch Lincoln, Governor of Me., Message to the Joint Select Committee of the House
and Senate of Maine (Jan. 5, 1828), in RESOLVES, supra note 161, at 661.
157
158
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sovereignty composing one of its members.”166 Given the idea of territorial
“dominion” expressed in the law of nations, Lincoln argued that “it cannot be
supposed that [the states] ever intended to give to the general government
any power by which they might be destroyed and consolidated . . . .”167
Reﬂecting the complex idea of the eminent dominion that pervaded his era,
Lincoln made title, jurisdiction, and sovereignty coextensive.168 Whether
lands were cultivated or vacant, territory that was the dominion of the state
could not be ceded.169 Nor could Maine cede the territory to another
sovereign on its own.170
Maine’s constitutional cri de coeur consumed Lincoln’s governorship.
Lincoln’s successor, Governor Samuel Smith, continued to press the “justice
of the[] claim” by “the people of the state” to the disputed territory.171
When the rumor reached Maine that the King of the Netherlands had
arbitrated the boundary, Smith wrote to the federal government to express his
concern that the “boundaries, as designated by treaties, have been totally
disregarded.”172 Maine saw in the treaty of peace “[a] power of dismembering
States” that “might in its consequences break down and absorb all the State
sovereignties.”173 Maine added that “[i]f the . . . United States can cede a portion
of an independent State to a foreign government, she can, by the same principle,
cede the whole . . . she can by the same principle annex one State to another
until the whole are consolidated, and become the sole sovereign . . . .”174
Maine’s resistance to the arbitrator’s award thus stumbled upon a diﬃcult
question: if all American governments are deprived of a treaty-making power
of cession, can territory ever be alienated to purchase peace without amending
the Constitution? The question would haunt Maine’s constitutional theory.
Maine would argue only that the power of cession “cannot be exercised
without the agreement and consent of the State, if it can be done[] without the
agreement and consent of all the States in the manner provided for amending

Id. at 694.
Id. at 695.
Id. at 699.
See id. (noting that Massachusetts had presumed that British settlers would not attempt to
settle on Massachusetts land and would immediately withdraw if they so did accidentally).
170 See Letter from Enoch Lincoln, Governor of Me., to John Quincy Adams, U.S. President (May
29, 1827), in RESOLVES, supra note 161, at 751 (explaining the Governor’s belief that Maine was “bound
from deference” to notify the federal government that Britain had claimed a tract of the state’s land).
171 Letter from Samuel E. Smith, Governor of Me., to Andrew Jackson, U.S. President (Mar.
2, 1831) (on ﬁle with author).
172 Id.
173 Report of the Select Committee of the Maine House of Representatives (Feb. 28, 1831), in
RESOLVES OF THE ELEVENTH LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF MAINE 242, 244 (Portland, Todd
& Holden 1831).
174 Id.
166
167
168
169
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or altering the Constitution.”175 Like Massachusetts’s argument against
annexing Texas by treaty, Maine’s federalism would, if taken to its conclusion,
have required some plebiscitary act by the dormant sovereign before its
dominion could be ceded to another sovereign.176
President Jackson referred Maine’s objections to the Secretary of State
and appended a handwritten instruction to assess the merits of Maine’s
arguments.177 He also referred the arbitrator’s award to the Senate, which in
turn debated whether it had anything to do. On the one hand, as Webster
argued, the Treaty of Ghent already committed the United States to
arbitration, and the President was in need of no advice or consent to “take
care” that the treaty was executed. On the other hand, the Treaty of Ghent
might be an “imperfect” treaty, which might require additional advice and
consent.178 The latter constitutional claim won out, and thirty-four of fortytwo Senators voted against “ratifying” the arbitrator’s award.179
Following the Senate’s vote, Secretary of State Livingston wrote to his
British counterpart to advance a number of arguments impugning the arbitral
award. He explained that Maine now “disputes the right of the United States
to diminish the extent of her territory,”180 and proposed yet another round of
negotiations to clarify the line provided by the Treaty of 1783. After
expressing some exasperation, the British agent asked whether “any
arrangement for avoiding the constitutional diﬃculty . . . has yet been
concluded between the United States and the State of Maine.”181
There had been a remarkable arrangement. On February 14, 1832, Jackson
instructed Secretary of State Livingston to speak privately with a Mainer
involved in the boundary dispute.182 Livingston conveyed a general
agreement with Maine’s argument: if the arbitrator’s award deviated from the
Treaty of 1783, “a question would arise as to the power of the U.S. to establish

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
See, e.g., Note from Andrew Jackson, U.S. President (June 23, 1831) (on file with National
Archives, NARA RG PI-170, Entry 89, No. 61) (referring the report to the “Sec. of State for his reflection
and deliberation and a synopsis of the reply . . . to be given, when the proper time arrives . . . .”).
178 See FRANCIS M. CARROLL, A GOOD AND WISE MEASURE: THE SEARCH FOR THE
CANADIAN-AMERICAN BOUNDARY 190-91 (2001).
179 Proceeding of the Senate on the Subject of the North Eastern Boundary, NILES WKLY.
REG., Aug. 25, 1832, at 464.
180 Report on the Northeastern Boundary at 2 (unpublished and undated manuscript) (on ﬁle
with National Archives, NARA RG 76, PI-170).
181 Id. at 4.
182 See Memorandum from Mr. Livingston & Mr. Preble (Feb. 15, 1832) (on ﬁle with National
Archives, NARA RG 76, Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations)
(“Pursuant to instructions given to me by the President yesterday I requested W. Preble to meet me
at the Department . . . .”).
175
176
177
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any such new boundary at the expense of one or more of the States.”183
Whatever the answer to the constitutional question, Livingston admitted that
“the President was extremely desireous of . . . an arrangement” to resolve the
impasse.184 Livingston proposed an “informal negotiation with some person
duly authorized to act for the State of Maine.”185 This artiﬁce was necessary,
Livingston said, because “an agreement between the Executive of the U.S.
and an individual state could neither have the form nor the eﬀect of a treaty
[since] the President had no power to cede the lands of the U.S.”186 In reply,
Maine’s Governor appointed, “with the advice and consent of Council,” three
“Commissioners” empowered to “arrive at some . . . arrangement between
the Government of [Maine] and of the United States . . . .”187 Andrew
Jackson, in turn, instructed his Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Navy, to all
meet with Maine’s commissioners in Washington.
The six agents of the state and federal governments met throughout May
and June of 1832, and concluded an “agreement”: if new negotiations with
Britain “should be impracticable,” Maine would consent to a “mutually
convenient” boundary.188 The federal government’s compensation to Maine was
rich: Maine would receive the value of 1,000,000 acres of territory in presentday Michigan.189 The agreement between Maine’s three commissioners and the
Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Navy, was signed and sealed and remains in
the State Department’s archives.
The legal eﬀect of this agreement was never tested. The following spring,
Maine rescinded the authority it had given to the commissioners and with it
scrapped the Jackson Administration’s ad hoc solution to the federalism
puzzle posed by cession of land.190 The agreement remained secret for six
years, until Massachusetts (which retained some title over the disputed
territory) publicly decried a “treaty” between Maine and the federal
government. This “treaty,” Massachusetts argued, was evidence that “the
Executive was satisﬁed that our claim . . . could not be yielded to Great
Britain without violating the constitution.”191 And, in 1837, Maine argued that
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Letter from Samuel Smith, Governor of Me., to Andrew Jackson, U.S. President (May 10,
1832) (on ﬁle with National Archives, NARA RG 76, PI-170, Entry 89, No. 77).
188 Memorandum signed by Maine Commissioners 4 (unpublished and undated manuscript)
(on ﬁle with National Archives, NARA RG 76, PI-70, No. 83).
189 Id.
190 CARROLL, supra note 178, at 193.
191 COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., REPORT AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMMITTEE OF
THE LEGISLATURE OF MASSACHUSETTS IN RELATION TO THE NORTHEAST BOUNDARY, S. 25431, at 30 (1838).
183
184
185
186
187
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even if there were an agreement between the state of Maine and the federal
government authorizing the cession of some land, “[i]t is . . . by no means
certain how far such consent [by the state] would enable the Treaty authority
to exert its powers.”192 In Maine’s renewed attack on the arbitral award, it
pressed the theory that no treaty-making power allowed governments to trade
away their subjects. Even a treaty attracting the consent of the Senate,
President, and the “constitutional organs” of Maine might still be deﬁcient
because “[c]itizens might be made the subjects of a treaty transfer,
and . . . allegiance and protection being reciprocally binding, the right to
transfer a citizen to a foreign government—to sell him . . . might . . . be[]
inconsistent with the spirit of our free institutions.”193
This most diﬃcult entailment of Maine’s constitutional theory—that
neither government could cede the people to other sovereigns, even if the two
governments worked together—would never be answered in this period.
Once the State Department understood that Maine’s vision of federalism
could be useful, it invoked Maine’s objection to reject the arbitrator’s award.
Maine thus gave the federal government a winning negotiating tactic: if
Britain would agree to settle, there would be no constitutional crisis because
there would be no unlawful cession; if Britain resisted, then Maine stood
ready to deprive the general government of the power to negotiate.194
While every federal administration before had been careful to avoid
engaging with the merits of Maine’s constitutional claim (and, indeed, had
grumbled about Maine’s entry into international diplomacy), by 1838 caution
gave way to embrace. Secretary of State John Forsyth wrote to Maine to
aﬃrm that “every successive Administration of the Federal Government in
respect to its powers” has accepted that “the General Government is not
competent . . . unless, perhaps, on grounds of imperious public necessity [to
agree to] . . . a cession of territory . . . or the exchange thereof for other
territory . . . without the consent of the State.”195

192 STATE OF MAINE, REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE MAINE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, at 2-3 (1837) (emphasis omitted) (on ﬁle with National Archives, NARA RG
76, PI-170, Entry 131).
193 Id. at 3.
194 See Report on the Northeastern Boundary, supra note 180, at 18 (“[T]he only alternative
being . . . to decide a conventional line of boundary . . . and the [U]nited [S]tates, not having the
power to adopt the former without the assent of Maine . . . [we will] make another eﬀort to discover
the line of the treaty.”); see also Letter from John Forsyth to Sir Charles Vaughan (Apr. 28, 1835),
reprinted in S. Doc. No. 24-414, at 54 (1836) (“[T]he President does not possess the power to establish
a conventional boundary, without the assent of the State of Maine . . . .”).
195 Letter from John Forsyth, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Edward Kent, Governor of Me. (Mar. 1,
1838), in 3 JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS, 1789–1908, at 442, 442 (1909) [hereinafter MESSAGES AND PAPERS].
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Forsyth also told his British counterpart that his government “has no
power to agree” to a new boundary, since “a division of the disputed
territory . . . would be considered by Maine as tantamount to a
cession . . . and . . . the Federal Government has no power to agree to such
an arrangement without the consent of the State concerned.”196 Maine’s
constitutional politics succeeded, and its entrepreneurial constitutional
argument was embraced by the federal government. The treaty power had
found its ﬁrst durable limit.
Throughout 1840–1842, Webster undertook a public relations campaign in
Maine to support an international resolution of the boundary crisis.197 Most
fatefully, the federal government invited both Maine and Massachusetts to
send commissioners to Washington to settle the boundary in concert with
Great Britain. The Governor of Maine, still grasping at the proper mode of
speaking for “the people,” recalled both houses of the legislature. The
legislature in turn elected four commissioners. The Governor of
Massachusetts had no quibbles about constitutional form and appointed, sua
sponte, three commissioners.198 All were given commissions investing them
with the full power of the states’ governments.
Thus a large retinue of commissioners, foreign and domestic, arrived in
Washington to finally settle the boundary. By July of 1842, Webster wrote to
the state commissioners with the last, best offer. Great Britain and the United
States would settle a boundary line, would exchange “equivalent” territory
where that new line prejudiced something valuable, and would purchase the
two states’ constitutional forbearance. Webster promised “that if the
commissioners of the two states assent . . . the United States will undertake to
pay to these states the sum of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars . . . .”199
Massachusetts replied ﬁrst. Massachusetts conceded that “[w]hether the
national boundary . . . be suitable or unsuitable . . . are questions not for
Massachusetts, but for the general government, upon its responsibility to the
196 See Letter from Henry S. Fox to John Forsyth, U.S. Sec’y of State (Jan. 10, 1838), in
MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 195, at 433, 433 (1909); see also Report on the Northeastern
Boundary, supra note 180, at 28 (“The Federal government cannot alienate any portion of the
territory of a State, and there is little prospect that the State of Maine . . . would agree to the
establishment of a new [boundary] line.”). The position represented a fortuitous change of view. As
British negotiators explained, the whole conceit of the original arbitration was that the title was not
yet quieted for either party: “[T]he title to the disputed territory is left imperfect by the
treaty. . . . [T]he territory between the highlands claimed by the United States is not the absolute
property of either party, and is not such territory as the United States can be constitutionally
prevented from relinquishing.” Report on the Northeastern Boundary, supra note 179, at 8.
197 See CARROLL, supra note 178, at 243-63.
198 See id. at 260-61.
199 Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Me. Comm’rs (July 15, 1842), in THE
DIPLOMATIC AND OFFICIAL PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER WHILE SECRETARY OF STATE 41, 43
(New York, Harper & Bros. 1848) [hereinafter PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER].
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whole country, to decide.”200 It promised to “relinquish[] to the United States
[Massachusetts’] interest in the lands which will be excluded from the
dominion of the United States”—provided that the General Government
increased its oﬀer by twenty percent.201
Maine then agreed, begrudgingly. While disavowing any “mercenary” or
“extortion[ate]” intentions, it once again argued that it was bound to resist
any “curtailment or dismemberment” of its dominion.202 The last paragraphs
of Maine’s response pivoted, however, to concede that “the executive of the
United States, representing the sovereignty of the Union [now] assents” to
the treaty for the “general good.”203 Even though a new treaty would “lead to
a surrender of a portion of the birth-right of the people,” Maine’s
commissioners agreed to exercise the “power vested in them by . . . the
Legislature of Maine” to “assent” to a new treaty.204
The Senate quickly ratiﬁed the treaty. The ﬁnal boundary hewed closely
to the boundary line provided by the arbitration award so loathed by
Maine.205 Maine and Massachusetts each received $150,000 from the general
government.206 The equivalence in their disbursements means that the
liquidated value of Maine and Massachusetts’s constitutional objections was
about the same, notwithstanding the heightened value Maine claimed for its
sovereignty. The equivalence also suggests something about the value of
something Maine had called more valuable than the richest mine of gold: the
marginal value of Maine’s “jurisdiction and government”207 over the land was
zero, since it received no more than Massachusetts (which, having
relinquished sovereignty over Maine, made no such claims to an eminent
dominion over the land).

200 Letter from Comm’rs of Mass., to Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec’y of State (July 20, 1842), in
PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER, supra note 199, at 49.
201 Id. at 49.
202 Letter from Comm’rs of Me., to Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec’y of State (July 22, 1842), in
PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER, supra note 199, at 55.
203 Id. at 56.
204 Id.
205 Compare J.L. Herbert, Map Showing British and American Territories with Lands in
Dispute on the Maine, Quebec and New Brunswick Borders (1831) (facsimile on ﬁle with Yale
University Library Map Collection), with Topographical Map of Maine Boundary, USGS
TOPOVIEW, https://ngmdb.usgs.gov/topoview/viewer/#9/47.1117/-68.9231 [https://perma.cc/AW78RA8M] (last visited Mar. 21, 2020) (showing Maine boundary).
206 See Webster-Ashburton Treaty, Gr. Brit.-U.S., art. V, Aug. 9, 1842, 8 Stat. 572. (“[T]he
Government of the United States agreeing, with the States of Maine and Massachusetts, to pay
them the further sum of three hundred thousand dollars, in equal moieties . . . .”).
207 As Webster recorded, while Maine and Massachusetts each had “an interest in the soil,”
Maine claimed an interest “in the jurisdiction and government.” Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S.
Sec’y of State, to John Fairﬁeld, Governor of Me. (Apr. 11, 1842), in PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER,
supra note 199, at 37.
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Despite the central role of Maine’s constitutional politics, the preambular
declarations of the ﬁnal Webster-Ashburton treaty obscure the constitutional
contest: this was an ordinary treaty, arising solely between the United States
and Her Majesty the Queen. But the treaty’s substance records the price of
Maine’s constitutional acquiescence. Article V provided that the United
States would pay Maine and Massachusetts “three hundred thousand
dollars . . . on account of their assent to the line of boundary described in
th[e] treaty . . . .”208 Great Britain’s representative insisted on publishing a
record that “my Government incurs no responsibility for these engagements,”
and protested that he was completely uninformed of the “nature and object”
of the payments to Maine and Massachusetts.209 Webster wrote the same day
to acknowledge that England would not incur “any responsibility” under
Article V.210 This correspondence was attached to the treaty, though it does
not appear in the ﬁnal instrument of ratiﬁcation.211
The treaty establishing Maine’s ﬁnal boundary looks to modern eyes like
an ordinary boundary settlement between coequal international sovereigns,
with little to signal the ﬁfty years of constitutional controversy that preceded
its ratiﬁcation. Maine’s two decades of constitutional politics nevertheless left
an imprint on the mid- to late-nineteenth-century vocabulary of foreignaﬀairs federalism: no American government holds the eminent dominion
necessary to cede territory to other sovereigns.
Maine’s victory was eventually memorialized by the Supreme Court, but
not in a treaty-power dispute. In Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, the Court
drew upon the history of Maine not to limit the federal treaty-making power,
but rather to limit the states’ power to cede territory without the federal
government’s consent.212
In Fort Leavenworth, a railroad company attempted to recover taxes it had
paid to the state through which its railway ran, on the theory (among others)
that the state had ceded its jurisdiction to tax the railroad to the federal
government.213 In rejecting the railroad’s argument, the Court included two
important dicta that illustrate the importance of Maine’s resistance to modern
foreign-aﬀairs federalism.

Webster-Ashburton Treaty, supra note 206, art. V.
Letter from Lord Ashburton, Her Britannic Majesty’s Minister Plenipotentiary on Special
Mission, to Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec’y of State (Aug. 9, 1842), in 4 T.I.A.S. 371, 371.
210 Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Lord Ashburton, Her Britannic
Majesty’s Minister Plenipotentiary on Special Mission (Aug. 9, 1842), in 4 T.I.A.S. 371, 371.
211 See Notes to Document 99, in 4 T.I.A.S. 372, 372 (“[The] notes were among the papers
accompanying the treaty when it was submitted to the Senate . . . but they were not mentioned in
the Senate resolution of advice and consent . . . or referred to in either instrument of ratiﬁcation.”).
212 114 U.S. 525 (1885).
213 Id. at 528.
208
209
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The ﬁrst dictum of Fort Leavenworth was that the Maine boundary dispute
had established that “whether represented by her Legislature, or through a
convention specially called for that purpose,” no state may “cede her political
jurisdiction and legislative authority over any part of her territory to a foreign
country[] without the concurrence of the general government.”214 The Court
thus elided the problem of representation posed by a treaty of cession by
concluding that the state and the federal government must agree to do it. The
Court further elided the problem of representing the popular sovereign’s
interest in such a cession by remarking that a legislature or “a convention
specially called” could authorize a cession.215 In the cases of Maine and
Massachusetts, the Court noted, “[i]t was not deemed necessary to call a
convention of the people” to empower the states’ commissioners to act.216 The
Court explained that while the federal and state governments are diﬀerent,
they are closer kin than foreign sovereigns: “the State and general
government[] may deal with each other in any way they may deem best to
carry out the purposes of the Constitution.”217 On the facts presented, the
Court had no need to decide the question of cession.218
The Court’s second important dictum in Fort Leavenworth was its
explanation that the general government “possess[es] the right of eminent
domain within the States, using those terms, not as expressing the ultimate
dominion or title to property, but as indicating the right to take private
property for public uses. . . .”219 The Court’s dwelling on the deﬁnition of
“eminent domain”—that is, that “eminent domain” does not signify “ultimate
dominion or title to property”—marked the growth of American public law
to reject the law-of-nations idea of the “domin. eminens.”220 The story of that
evolution, and the constitutional battles that occasioned it, are the subject of
the next Section.
B. The Sovereign’s Title
The exercise of the treaty-making power to barter territory created a
second-order constitutional diﬃculty related to acquisition: which sovereign
held original title to—or “eminent dominion” over—the unappropriated land

Id. at 540.
Id.
Id. at 541.
Id.
Id. at 541-42 (explaining that if the cession were proved defective, that would simply leave
the state’s original taxing power intact).
219 Id. at 531.
220 Id.
214
215
216
217
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within new territory acquired by the federal government?221 While the issue
was being resolved, some unusual arguments migrated from the frivolous to
the mainstream. Meanwhile, the domestication of the law-of-nations idea of
the eminent dominion reached its apex in American political argument.
To abbreviate a familiar history, in the ﬁrst decades of the republic, the
original thirteen states ceded vast portions of their Westward territory to the
federal government. Congress then considered various proposals to structure
the admission process for new states composed of that land in order to “secure
to the [federal government] the proceeds of the sales of the Western
lands, . . . to discharge the public debt, for which [the lands] are solemnly
pledged.”222 Thus, “to secure to the Union their right to the soil,” the
compacts of admission would forbid the new states from interfering with the
federal government’s sale or regulation of its lands; taxing the federal lands
awaiting sale; or disproportionately taxing non-resident purchasers.223 In
exchange, Congress would grant the states one section in each surveyed
township for schools, and a fraction of the proceeds of all land sales to aid in
the construction of public roads.224 In Ohio, for example, Congress limited
the amount given to the state to ﬁve percent of the net proceeds of federal
land sales.225 The states were generally given one-twentieth of the public
lands within their limits to ﬁnance their internal improvements.226 Federal
title to the rest was protected in triplicate: treaties of cession; compacts; and
conditions included in the statutes enabling the territories to enter the

221 I bracket an inquiry into the title of indigenous people to this land. I do so for the sake of
airing what these partisans took to be a discrete public law inquiry, but I do not mean to imply that
indigenous peoples’ claim to original sovereign title was either spurious or settled.
222 Letter from Albert Gallatin to William B. Giles, Chairman of the Comm. for Admitting
the North-Western Territory into the Union (Feb. 13, 1802), in 1 THE WRITINGS OF ALBERT
GALLATIN 76, 76 (Henry Adams ed., London, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1879).
223 Id. at 77 (“States shall never interfere with the primary disposal of the soil by Congress; nor
with any regulations which Congress may find necessary . . . [and] no tax shall be imposed on the
property of the United States [nor] shall non-resident proprietors be taxed higher than residents.”).
224 Id. at 78.
225 See Ohio Enabling Act of 1802, Pub. L. No. 7-40, 2 Stat. 173, 175 § 7 (1802) (“[O]ne
twentieth part of the nett proceeds of the lands lying within the said state sold by Congress . . . shall
be applied to the laying out and making public roads . . . .”).
226 Id.; HANNIS TAYLOR, THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
256 (1911).
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union.227 Only Texas retained title to its public lands after its above-described
unorthodox admission to the union.228
Although it accounts for a vanishingly small portion of the modern federal
ﬁsc, the federal government’s income from land was the only substantial
source of revenue apart from customs duties and the tariﬀ.229 The new states
were left to view the federal public lands with jealousy. In 1845, a critical year
in the story that follows, the state of Illinois collected $305,309.03 from all
sources between 1845 and 1846, of which only $184.37 came from the sale of
public land.230 In the same period, Alabama collected $274,246.79 from all
sources.231 Yet the federal government realized $609,366.14 from the sale of
public lands in Illinois and $97,369.81 from the sale of public lands in
Alabama.232 In the delicate words of a House Select Committee, “[t]he new
States . . . occupy a peculiar position with regard to their soil, having it owned
by another government than their own.”233
Illinois and Alabama especially loathed their “peculiar” eminent
dominion. They channeled their loathing into constitutional litigation.
Illinois was the innovator. In 1828, Governor Ninian Edwards addressed his
legislature and invoked the dominium eminens to decry his state’s “onetwentieth share” of its “sovereignty.”234 Edwards argued that “instead of that

227 See, e.g., Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. 4 (codiﬁed at 1 U.S.C. LV-LVII (2018))
(establishing a congressionally-appointed secretary and setting aside 500 acres as the secretary’s
preserve); Ohio Enabling Act of 1802, supra note 225, § 7 (granting Section 16 to each township and
remitting 5 percent of federal land sale revenue to the states); Resolutions for the Government of
the Western Territory, passed Apr. 23, 1784 (repealed 1787), in PUBLIC LAND COMMISSION, THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN, ITS HISTORY, WITH STATISTICS 148, 148-49 (Washington, Gov’t Printing Oﬀ.
1880) (discussing the division of land ceded by the states to the federal government and conditions
imposed by Congress on those wishing to form new states in the ceded territory); Treaty of Paris of
1783, Gr. Brit.-U.S., art. 1, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80, 81 (relinquishing all territorial claims held by the
British Crown to the United States).
228 See ALDON SOCRATES LANG, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LANDS IN TEXAS
23 (1932) (noting that Texas is “the only public land state that has had complete control over both
the public lands within its boundaries and the proceeds arising from . . . [the] sale of the lands”).
229 See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, AN ACCOUNT OF THE RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES
OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1776, at XIV (1886) (noting
$309,710,959.92 in receipts from the sale of public lands in 1886). Nearly all the remainder came
from the tariﬀ. See id. at VIII (noting $184,902,215.20 in receipts from customs).
230 See JOHN A. FAIRLIE, A REPORT ON THE TAXATION AND REVENUE SYSTEM OF
ILLINOIS 243 (1910).
231 See AMERICAN ALMANAC AND REPOSITORY OF USEFUL KNOWLEDGE FOR THE YEAR
1847, at 267 (Boston, James Munroe & Co. 1846).
232 REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE, H.R. Doc. No. 299, at 15 (1846).
233 SWAMP LANDS IN WISCONSIN AND ARKANSAS, H.R. Rep. No. 30-130, at 11 (1849).
234 See Ninian W. Edwards, HISTORY OF ILLINOIS FROM 1778 TO 1833: LIFE AND TIMES OF
NINIAN EDWARDS 113, 119 (Springﬁeld, State J. Co. 1870) (“The right which belongs to the society,
or to the sovereign, of disposing, in case of necessity, and for the public safety, of all the wealth
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equality with our sister States, . . . we [are] reduced to the twentieth part of
a State, with little detached spots of sovereignty, to be ascertained only by
going to the Land Oﬃces, and hunting for the quarter and half quarter
sections of lands . . . .”235 Edwards argued that “domain and empire are
inseparable,” and that whoever holds “territory . . . ha[s] the exclusive right
to govern it . . . . Both rights must concur, or neither can exist.”236 Indeed,
Edwards continued, “Sovereignty gives the empire, or right of commanding
in all places of the country belonging to the nation.”237 In short, Edwards
thought that the eminent dominion must defeat federal title: “[t]he
sovereignty of a State includes the right to exercise supreme and exclusive
control over all lands within it.”238
For proof of his distinctive theory of the title to public lands, Edwards
invited the Illinois legislature to “hear Vattel on the subject.”239
Notwithstanding the statutes and treaties securing the federal title to the land,
all such “bargains, agreements, compacts or treaties . . . are [] perfect nullities”
because “the United States can neither possess nor exercise the powers of
sovereignty over nineteen-twentieths of the territory within the limits of a
sovereign and independent State . . . .”240 Edwards asked his legislature to
petition for a return of the public lands, and to pursue relief in the courts.
Edwards’s political theory was thus a prototypical mixture of an appeal to
dual-sovereign federalism and the idea of eminent dominion domesticated
from the law of nations. Title to soil was simply part of the eminent dominion
that all sovereigns—new states included—enjoy as a matter of public law: “If
[the states] have not all these powers they have none, in virtue of the right of
jurisdiction. The exercise of one is, therefore, a claim to all.”241
Edwards’s speech laying claim to Illinois’s eminent dominion was widely
circulated. It found its way to the inﬂuential publisher of the Washington
Telegraph. He wrote to Edwards less than two weeks after the address, and

contained in the State, is called eminent domain . . . . [and it] is everywhere considered inseparable
from the sovereignty.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).
235 Id. at 121.
236 Id. (emphasis added).
237 Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
238 Id. at 118.
239 Id. at 119.
240 Id. at 113. Edwards assumed away the problem posed by the silence of the Constitution
regarding the power to acquire territory. See id. at 120 (arguing that Article 4, Section 3 of the
Constitution only applies to territory “beyond the limits or boundaries of any other States” and that
by admitting a State into the union, Congress has thus “released the claim of the United States to
all lands that lie within it” (ﬁrst quotation quoting 17 JOHNSON’S REPORTS 223)).
241 Id. at 122.
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declared that he was “prepared to defend” Illinois’s claim.242 He agreed with
Edwards but warned that “I greatly doubt . . . your success before the
Supreme Court. That Court, like other great things, dwindles as you
approach it.”243 He would later write that if Illinois were to succeed in
breaking federal title, it “will be the work of time, four years may not be
enough. You . . . run butt against the Supreme Court . . . . In that Court is
lodged [John Marshall] the Tyrant, the monarch of this country.”244 The
Telegraph’s editorial page then proclaimed to the Washington elite that “[t]he
constitutional rights of the new States have never, until of late, been
demanded. . . . Give the people light.”245 The paper implored “the West [to]
examine and understand how far that system, which has made them tributary
to the other States, is sanctioned by the Constitution, and the treaties of
cession through which the Federal Government claims title . . . .”246
Nearly all of the old states opposed the effort to cede the public lands to
the new states. In January 1827, Senator Barton took the floor to urge Congress
not to “rip up the goose that lays the golden eggs.”247 If Illinois’s argument
were accepted, Barton continued, the opponents of federal title would
“syllogi[ze]” themselves “out of the Union” because “[t]he same Constitution
that authorizes the admission of new States[] also authorizes the [federal]
holding and disposing of the Western lands . . . .”248 Barton did not let the new
states’ law-of-nations gloss on the eminent domain go unanswered. He
explained that “[t]o talk of ‘eminent domain,’ and Vattel, in a case created and
regulated by our own Constitution, is an idle affectation of learning.”249
Notwithstanding the objections of old states, Edwards was joined in the
Senate by other politicians who saw the utility of appealing to the new states’
interests—especially Senator John McKinley.250 In 1828, McKinley referred a
242 Letter from Duﬀ Green, Publisher of Wash. Tel., to Ninian Edwards, Governor of Ill.
(Dec. 22, 1828), in 3 NINIAN W. EDWARDS, THE EDWARDS PAPERS 377, 378 (E. B. Washburne ed.,
Chicago, Fergus Printing Co. 1884).
243 Id. at 379.
244 Letter from Duﬀ Green, Publisher of Wash. Tel., to Ninian Edwards, Governor of Ill. (Jan.
6, 1829), in 3 NINIAN W. EDWARDS, THE EDWARDS PAPERS 379, 380-81 (E. B. Washburne ed.,
Chicago, Fergus Printing Co. 1884).
245 WASH. TELEGRAPH, Apr. 24, 1828 (emphasis omitted).
246 Id.
247 3 REGISTER OF DEBATES IN CONGRESS 43 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1829).
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Professors Ablavsky and Leshy have recently elaborated Justice McKinley’s involvement
with these public land disputes with more precision. See Gregory Ablavsky, The Rise of Federal Title,
106 CAL. L. REV. 631, 675 (2018) (“McKinley fretted that [federal] ownership [of land under states’
navigable waters] would give the federal government a ‘weapon’ to wield against ‘state
sovereignty’ . . . .”); see also John D. Leshy, Are U.S. Public Lands Unconstitutional?, 69 HASTINGS
L.J. 499, 535 (2018) (highlighting that McKinley expressed that to “deny Alabama the ownership of
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memorial from Alabama to the committee on public lands seeking the sale of
all public land to the state.251 The proposal died in committee.252
After the committee refused to act, McKinley took to the Senate floor,
Vattel in hand, to argue that “the ablest jurists of ancient and modern times
agree that sovereignty is necessarily and inseparably connected with the
territory and right of soil over which it is exercised. So essential is this right, that
sovereignty cannot exist without it.”253 He quickly drew out the implication:
“the creation of a sovereign State over this territory . . . was of itself a transfer
of the whole title to the land, and right of domain of the United States to the
new States.”254 In short: The eminent dominion gives new states title.
Like Edwards, McKinley dismissed the conditions placed on his state’s
admission as nullities. “If the United States can enter into treaties or
compacts with the new States for the acquisition of sovereignty, . . . she may
do the same with the old States, and thereby change, amend, or destroy the
fundamental law of the land . . . .”255 McKinley ominously warned that “[i]f
the United States refuse to give or sell to us what we believe we are
constitutionally entitled to, we . . . will continue to complain until we obtain
our rights.”256 It was no idle threat: in 1837, McKinley was appointed to the
Supreme Court, where he decided one crucial and profoundly misleading
case—Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan.257
In 1845, Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan came to the Supreme Court as a
shopworn land-title case, involving a minor variation on a theme that had
occupied the Court many times before. By way of background, once American
sovereignty over Alabama territory was settled, Congress began to sort
through complex property claims created by the administration of prior
sovereigns. In 1824, Congress granted title to unoccupied water lots—which

the beds of navigable waters would be ‘to deny that Alabama has been admitted into the union on
an equal footing with the original states’” (quoting Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 229 (1845))).
251 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 133 (Washington, D.C.,
Duﬀ Green 1827).
252 See JOHN MCKINLEY, SPEECH ON THE BILL TO GRADUATE THE PRICE OF PUBLIC
LANDS 19 (Washington, D.C., Green & Jarvis 1828) (“A majority of that Committee decided against
selling the lands to Alabama . . . .”).
253 4 REG. DEB. 509 (1828) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
254 Id. at 509-10 (emphasis added).
255 Id. at 512; see also id. at 514 (“I have shown, by irresistible implication, that Congress
believed that the new States would be entitled to the land within their limits, and all the other rights
of eminent domain, of which they have been deprived . . . .”).
256 Id. at 521. McKinley published the speech the month later and prefaced it with the hope
that the reader would be led “to a full and fair investigation of the constitutional powers of the
General and State Governments.” MCKINLEY, supra note 252, at 3.
257 44 U.S. (1 How.) 212 (1845).
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were below the high water mark of the Mobile River—to the city of Mobile.258
The statute further provided, however, that if those lots had been improved,
title was instead “vested in the several proprietors and occupants.”259
Litigation ensued: could the improvers take title under the federal grant?
In 1839, the Alabama Supreme Court embraced Illinois’s theory of the
eminent dominion in denying the federal grant to the improvers. In City of
Mobile v. Eslava,260 the City and Miguel Eslava each claimed title—Eslava as
improver, Mobile under the broader grant. The Alabama court held that
Congress is “incompetent . . . to grant the space intervening between high
and low water marks” to the improvers.261 And, because Alabama is a coequal
sovereign, “the rights of sovereignty of the new [states] are quite as extensive
as those possessed by the original States.”262
When Eslava arrived at the Supreme Court, the majority was
unimpressed. The Court—sitting without Justice McKinley and Chief Justice
Taney—simply ignored the lower court’s opinion.263 The case required
statutory interpretation: was Eslava one of the individuals granted title to
improved water lots?264 If Eslava was an improver, title was his.265
Justice Catron lambasted the majority’s constitutional avoidance,
especially the pretense that the Court could not take notice of the opinion
below.266 He would have met Alabama’s constitutional theory directly: a treaty
gave the federal government eminent dominion. Catron marveled that
although it is “free from doubt” that “the United States acquired by cession
all his powers over the vacant soil,” yet Alabama nevertheless contended that
“the lands ﬂowed by the tides are . . . part of [Alabama’s] sovereign rights.”267
Catron detected a looming danger in the attempt to take the tide waters along
the river: on that thin reed the state could hang a claim to all public lands.268
When the Court followed the same path the next year in City of Mobile v.
Emanuel, Catron added that it was now “established with a plainness
admitting of no doubt, that Alabama . . . hold[s], by force of her judicial

258 An Act Granting Certain Lots of Ground to the Corporation of the City of Mobile, and
Certain Individuals of Said City, Pub. L. No. 18-185, 4 Stat. 66, 68-69 (1824).
259 Id.
260 City of Mobile v. Eslava, 9 Port. 577, 587-88 (Ala. 1839).
261 Id. at 590.
262 Id. at 603.
263 See 41 U.S. (1 Pet.) 234, 246 (1842) (holding that the lower court’s opinion “constitutes no
part of the record, and is not properly a part of the case”).
264 See id. (“Some doubt has been expressed whether the improvements required were to have
been made on the front or water lot.”).
265 Id. at 247.
266 Id. at 248 (Catron, J., concurring).
267 Id. at 252.
268 Id. at 254.
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decisions, all the lands within the state, ﬂowed by tide water . . . .”269 If
Alabama’s theory of the eminent dominion was right, Catron warned, it would
undo the Court’s precedents.270
The Court would indeed return to Alabama’s overﬂowed lands, though
not until Justice McKinley introduced the new states’ eminent dominion into
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.
In Hagan, McKinley precisely traced Illinois’s eminent-dominion
argument, and Vattel again supplied the necessary law-of-nations authority.
The “eminent domain,” McKinley wrote, means “[t]he right which belongs to
the society, or to the sovereign, of disposing, in case of necessity, and for the
public safety, of all the wealth contained in the state . . . .”271 McKinley
contended that the power of the eminent domain is “necessary” for
sovereigns.272 Because McKinley could lay claim to the variegated law-ofnations idea—in which sovereignty, jurisdiction, and title are commingled—
McKinley held that even if statutes and treaties granted the United States
title, they are “void and inoperative” against the states “because the United
States have no constitutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction,
sovereignty, or eminent domain, within the limits of a state or elsewhere,
except in the cases in which it is expressly granted.”273
These last few clauses of Hagan are historically signiﬁcant, both because
they reveal the law-of-nations genealogy of McKinley’s theory of the
“eminent domain,” and because they would be abused in the century and a
half that followed. Without further narrowing, McKinley’s rendition of the
“eminent domain” would require a radical reordering of federal title. After
all, McKinley’s theory of “eminent domain” was indistinguishable from
Illinois’s argument that it held title to all public lands.
The Hagan plaintiﬀs were shocked by the Court’s decision. Two weeks
after the opinion came down, the improver’s counsel moved for reargument,
admitting that “the question was regarded . . . as virtually settled . . . and
consequently it was not argued with as much care and preparation as its great
importance demanded.”274 Counsel observed that the Court’s new judgment
“involves the title to all the lands professed to have been granted by the
United States . . . as well as to vast quantities of land similarly
circumstanced.”275 Although the suit ostensibly involved a tiny sliver of land
42 U.S. (1 How.) 95, 102 (1843).
Id.
Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (1 How.) 212, 223 (1845).
Id. (citing VATTEL, supra note 68, § 244).
Id. at 223.
Motion for Rehearing, Feb. 19, 1845, Journal of the United States Supreme Court (on ﬁle
with National Archives, NARA RG 267, Box 244, Case 2313).
275 Id.
269
270
271
272
273
274
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on the Mobile River, “[a]s was remarked by one of the members of the
Court[,] this case turns upon a principle which involves a larger amount of
property than perhaps ever was in any one suit . . . .”276 The Court overruled
the motion a week later.277
The predicted upheaval in federal title never came to pass. Alabama courts
chose a narrow reading of Hagan: it applied only to the overflowed tidelands,
nothing more.278 The court in Doe ex dem. Kennedy v. Bebee advised the bar that
“[i]t is difficult to educe a harmonious system, even from the decisions of the
federal judiciary, in respect to private land claims in the States acquired from
France and Spain.”279 The court breathed a sigh of relief that “[t]his anomalous
litigation, under the influence of the statute of limitations, . . . must be drawing
to a close . . . .”280
To further mitigate the unraveling of federal title, Chief Justice Taney
summarized the Court’s activity when similar cases came to the Court: they
all involved the simple argument that “the premises were a part of the shore
of a navigable tide-water river, lying below high-water mark.”281 McKinley was
again absent from the Court when Taney smoothed over the prior cases,282 and
Hagan then faded to a minor decision in the environmental law canon.283
McKinley’s gloss on the eminent dominion has since led two lives in the
busy hands of constitutional lawyers. The least controversial reception of
Hagan adopts Taney’s synthesis: it settled that the shore below the high-water
mark belongs to the new states and the old states alike. McKinley’s broader
designs for Hagan proved irresistible, however, as time progressed.
One of the more important consumers of McKinley’s work was his
successor on the Court: John Archibald Campbell. Campbell was intimately
aware of the issues involved in Hagan and the politics that motivated its
Id.
Id.
Doe ex dem. Kennedy v. Bebee, 8 Ala. 909, 913-14 (1846).
Id. at 914.
Id. at 915.
Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 50 U.S. (1 How.) 471, 477 (1850).
Roll Call of Supreme Court Justices, Monday, May 15th, 1850 (on ﬁle with author).
Cf. BENJAMIN C. HOWARD, 3 REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY TERM 1845, at 223 n.1 (Stewart Rapalje ed.,
Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1884) (“The statement [in Hagan], that the United States
government has no power to take lands within the boundaries of a state by the exercise of the right
of eminent domain, has been overruled by the Supreme Court . . . without any reference to this
statement.”); see also generally William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE
L.J. 1738 (2013). In populating their Supreme Court database to include older Supreme Court
opinions, Westlaw editors used Rapalje’s 1884 edition of Hagan. Because Rapalje’s footnote does not
disclose that it was the editor’s own work, Rapalje’s interpretation that Hagan involved the takings
power—rather than other aspects of the eminent dominion—erroneously appears in Westlaw’s
report. See E-mail from Ben Petersburg, Westlaw Reference Attorney, to author (Oct. 21, 2014, 16:26
EST) (on ﬁle with author).
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
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distinctive federalism.284 Campbell’s most enduring contribution to the
reception of Hagan in the constitutional canon was an act of legal error,
committed in his concurrence to Dred Scott v. Sandford.285 In a passage
attacking the eﬀort to enlarge the free territory of the union, Campbell
revived the new states’ vision of the eminent dominion—one that exceeded
even McKinley’s elliptical prose. He wrote that in Hagan,
[T]he Court say[s]: “The United States have no constitutional capacity to
exercise municipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eminent domain, within the
limits of a State or elsewhere, except in cases where it is delegated, and the court
denies the faculty of the Federal Government to add to its powers by treaty or
compact.”286

Despite the quotation marks that surround it, all of the italicized material
was Campbell’s gloss—not a holding by the Hagan Court. While the Hagan
majority cautioned that no treaty could transfer “royal prerogatives” from the
Spanish Crown to the general government,287 it did not, Campbell claimed,
deny the federal government’s “faculty . . . to add to its powers by treaty.”288
In Campbell’s hands, Hagan came to express an enduring limitation on the
treaty-making power: no exercise of that power by the federal government
could infringe upon the states’ sovereignty. Campbell’s gloss on Hagan then
entered the twentieth century as a central piece of evidence that older
generations had constrained the treaty-making power to account for states’
rights. So, for example, when a 1908 American Society of International Law
(ASIL) conference addressed conflicts between treaties and state law, one
professor quoted Justice Campbell’s Hagan concurrence as evidence that the
Supreme Court had denied “the faculty of the Federal Government to add to
its powers by treaty.”289 Hagan was then emblematic of the view that “there are
constitutional limits [on the treaty power], despite the fact that the
Constitution grants the power without limitation . . . .”290 Because no principle
284 See Letter from John A. Campbell, Supreme Court Justice, to Judge Bragg (Jan. 3, 1853)
(on ﬁle with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Carl Brent Swisher papers, Box 4) (inviting
Bragg to make a “great speech” on the public lands since “half of Alabama belongs to the federal
government” and holding out an oﬀer of an investment in various water lots though there was “no
obligation upon [him] to do so from anything that took place at Washington” in connection with
Campbell’s conﬁrmation).
285 60 U.S. (1 How.) 393 (1856).
286 Id. at 508-09 (Campbell, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting Pollard’s Lessee v.
Hagan, 44 U.S. (1 How.) 212, 223 (1845)).
287 Hagan, 44 U.S. (1 How.) at 225.
288 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (1 How.) at 509 (Campbell, J., concurring).
289 W. W. Willoughby, Address at First Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law (Apr. 19, 1907), in 1 PROC. AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 201, 201 (1908) (quoting Dred
Scott, 60 U.S. (1 How.) at 509 (Campbell, J., concurring)).
290 Id.
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could unite these cases, the ASIL panelist insisted that our forebears left us an
enduring puzzle: the Supreme Court would eventually have to choose between
state and federal sovereigns in defining the limits of the treaty-making power.291
As I shall describe in the next Part, the panelist’s rendition of Hagan was of
a piece with the scholarship of his time. Constitutional historians writing during
the early-twentieth century made certain that the foreign-affairs powers would
start from a dual-sovereign premise but conclude with a vision of foreign-affairs
power that favored the national government. As the panelist noted, the national
government had lately acquired territory from other sovereigns “because other
sovereign states possess this power. This, indeed, was the only basis upon which
this act could be justified . . . .”292 In this way, the canonical constitutional
history of the acquisition power and the eminent dominion were rewritten to
shore up the federal sovereign’s power to practice imperial government.
III. THE FOREIGN-AFFAIRS INTERNMENT OF POPULAR-SOVEREIGN
FEDERALISM
Nearly every prominent history of foreign-aﬀairs federalism omits the
history of the eminent dominion described above. As I argue in what follows,
the prominent early-twentieth-century histories that frame the modern
conversation about the treaty-making power were written to shore up our last
episode of territorial conquest.293
It is worth considering whether this inherited history conveys something
immemorial about our constitutional structure, and whether the
constitutional vision endorsed by this history misshapes our modern
conversation. Two areas of the modern conversation trade upon this history:
the status of former sovereigns’ territory acquired with the treaty-making
power, and the scope of this power in light of American federalism. I discuss
each in turn.
A. The Sovereign’s Dominion and the Insular Histories
The ﬁrst decades of the twentieth century brought two jousting histories
of the Constitution’s limitations on the treaty-making power and that power’s
exercise in acquiring territory abroad. Despite some disagreement, both
framed a vision of the government’s foreign-aﬀairs power that assumed the
truth of dual sovereignty and the conservation-of-powers thesis. That is to
Id. at 203.
Id. at 206.
My claim that these treaty-power histories obscured earlier theories of the treaty-making
power’s limitations should not be read to suggest that the earlier eras were anti-imperial. Rather, my
claim is that these histories canonized an imperial treaty power. In so doing, these histories erased
popular-sovereign federalism from courts’ modern conversation.
291
292
293
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say, it became a truism of foreign-aﬀairs federalism that all law-of-nations
powers must have been distributed to the federal sovereign.
1. Creating a Canonical History of an Imperial Treaty Power
The first influential history of the treaty-making power was Charles Henry
Butler’s two-volume opus on the treaty-making power, which concluded in
1902 that “the treaty-making power . . . is derived not only from the powers
expressly conferred by the Constitution, but . . . is also possessed . . . as an
attribute of sovereignty . . . .”294 On this view, the popular sovereign had, in
fact, given the federal government the full measure of foreign-affairs power
that it might have otherwise given to the states.295 Accordingly, Congress could
legislate “co-extensive[ly]” with a plenary treaty-making power.296
Crucially for Butler, the prior century’s pattern of acquiring territory—
with no mention of the controversies described in the last Part of this
Article—furnished evidence of the “nationality and sovereignty”297 of the
federal government. That is because Butler thought that dual sovereignty and
the proposition that all powers were distributed to the sovereign American
governments were obvious: all sovereigns must have the “right” to “cede
territory to, and to acquire territory from, other sovereign powers.”298 If a
government cannot cede and acquire territory, that is because it “does not
possess the full measure of sovereignty.”299 Citing the Court’s opinion in
Canter, in which Marshall found the power of acquiring territory to be an
implication of the federal government’s treaty-making or war-making power,
Butler reasoned that since the federal government has not “surrendered any
of its fully sovereign powers, as to the matters wholly within its own domain,
the United States therefore possesses, in common with every other sovereign
power, this right of acquisition of territory.”300 Indeed, in his sustained
discussion of popular sovereignty in the United States, Butler emphasized
that the “people retain only that portion of sovereignty” that has been neither
delegated to the states nor held “by the United States in its national
capacity.”301 So understood, popular sovereignty “is a part of the heritage of
the Anglo-Saxon race” and will “naturally” exist in nations they compose.302
Popular sovereignty “does not, however, necessarily exist naturally in people
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302

1 CHARLES HENRY BUTLER, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 5 (1902).
Id. at 351.
Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 69-70.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 17.
Id.
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of other races.”303 The national treaty-making power can thus acquire
territory—consistent with its full measure of foreign-aﬀairs powers—yet it
does not thereby enlarge the popular sovereign’s domain. After the acquisition
of new people and new territory, it thus “remains for the United States to
clothe the people of the ceded possessions . . . with the same degree of
autonomy as other portions of our people possess.”304
Butler acknowledged some historical skepticism regarding the power to
acquire territory, but answered that Chief Justice Marshall had ended the
matter in Canter long before the Texas and Maine disputes.305 In an oblique
reference to the then-recent acquisition of the insular territories, Butler argued
that “it must be conceded at the present time that questions relating to
annexation . . . belong exclusively to the political departments of the
government . . . .”306 It was a belt-and-suspenders answer: the Supreme Court
had blessed the acquisition of territory in the 1820s, and, in any event, the
matter had become a political question that no court could now second guess.
As to the question of cession (that is, Maine’s constitutional grievance),
Butler did not acknowledge that there had ever been a cession of territory in
the United States. He advanced only the disputed law-of-nations principle
that “the consent of the inhabitants of territory, ceded by one sovereign power
to another, is not required to validate the transfer . . . .”307 As we have seen,
that position was disputed by law-of-nations publicists, and disregarded the
Maine boundary settlement, but would be necessary if the federal government
wished to acquire and hold foreign sovereignties as imperial possessions.308
In 1915, Henry St. George Tucker wrote the second influential history of
the treaty power as a rejoinder to Butler’s “nationalist” history.309 Tucker
argued that it was necessary to look to the Constitution, not the law of nations,
to “eliminate the prevalent error of the ‘unlimited’ and boundless scope of [the

Id.
Id.
Id. at 116-17.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 83 (emphasis added).
See generally FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 11. In 1908, Robert Devlin
similarly cited only Justice Marshall’s 1828 opinion in Canter for the principle that the government
“possesses the power of acquiring territory.” ROBERT T. DEVLIN, THE TREATY POWER UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 307-08 (1908) (citing Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26
U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 512 (1828)).
309 HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, LIMITATIONS ON THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE
UNITED STATES (1915); see also Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 881 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (citing Tucker’s work).
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treaty-making] power.”310 He singled Butler out for special criticism.311 Tucker
framed the problem as choosing which sovereign should be allowed to exercise
the fullest measure of civil power. Tucker then advanced the modern critique
of Missouri v. Holland: the treaty power must not be allowed to “annihilate
others equally important and equally supreme,” such as the states.312 To say
that the treaty-making power “may include the rights and powers of the
citizens of the States not granted to the Federal Government,” Tucker argued,
“is to claim a superiority for [federal] power over the . . . powers of the States,
which are equally supreme with the treaty-making power.”313
Unlike most post-Missouri treaty-power scholarship,314 Tucker
acknowledged both the contest-of-sovereigns and the contest-ofgovernments models of foreign-aﬀairs federalism. He called the former
“Jeﬀersonian” model and the latter “Hamiltonian.”315 The Jeﬀersonian school
contended that “the States, prior to the adoption of the Constitution, existed
as independent sovereigns; . . . and that from the reservoir of their original
powers they granted certain ones to the Federal Government . . . .”316 The
Hamiltonians, by contrast, view the Constitution as the result of the “whole
mass of the people of the United States, giving the Federal Government the
large powers contained therein and denying certain powers to the States.”317
On that model, “[t]here is one reservoir from which ﬂowed all powers, the
people of the United States as one body politic.”318 Tucker elected the
Jeﬀersonian model. On that view, the last clause of the Tenth Amendment
was superﬂuous: in ratifying the Constitution, the states “gave part and
310 TUCKER, supra note 309, at 3. Tucker’s book begins by claiming that the prior fifty years had
witnessed America’s rise to international prominence and a concurrent increase in its international
entanglements. Id. at 1. For the modern equivalent, see Bond, 572 U.S. at 895 (Thomas, J., concurring).
311 See TUCKER, supra note 309, at 120 (“When Mr. Butler declares that the treaty-making
power of the United States ‘extends to every subject that may be the basis of negotiation . . . between
any of the powers of the world,’ it is evident that his statement is too broad.” (alteration in original)).
312 Id. at 79.
313 Id. Tucker illustrated his critique elsewhere by asking his audience to imagine the absurdity
of a Frenchman selling liquor in Savannah, where blue laws prohibited local inhabitants from doing
the same. The Frenchman, Tucker conjectured, could outfit a resplendent barroom and say to the
local magistrate: “There is a treaty between France and this country which gives me the right over all
your little local State laws to do business as I please.” HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE TREATY-MAKING POWER 1-2 (1917) (internal quotation marks omitted).
314 But see Cleveland, Powers Inherent, supra note 58, at 268 (explaining that by the earlytwentieth century, “the assumption that all sovereign powers were held by either the national or
state governments facilitated the conclusion that a power was held by the national government
whenever state authority was inappropriate,” and that this assumption “eliminat[ed] the possibility
that power had been reserved to the people”).
315 TUCKER, supra note 309, at 329.
316 Id. at 83.
317 Id.
318 Id. at 84.
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retained part” of their sovereign powers, so that “the[] reserved powers
referred to in the Tenth Amendment were supreme in their sphere.”319 On
Tucker’s account, the Maine and Texas disputes supplied proof of the nonsupremacy of treaties: the acquisition of Texas by congressional resolution
and the payment of funds to Maine proved only that treaties are not
“supreme” over the House of Representatives.320
Our modern history of the treaty power labors in the shadow of the
histories written during the imperial era. Both Tucker’s and Butler’s histories
prevalently appear in courts and scholars’ recent puzzling over the scope of
the federal government’s treaty power. As I shall argue, the problem of
territorial acquisition was critical context for the authors’ normative claims
about the scope of the treaty-making power.
2. Claiming Imperial Dominion over the Insular Territories
Butler, Tucker, Moore, and even Brown—whose 1920 history of the
Louisiana Purchase noted that the debates about the Insular Cases were so
replete with references to the Louisiana Purchase they had become a “source
book of constitutional documents” on the Purchase321—were all engaging
with the contemporary fact of American imperial government.322
Accordingly, their theories of foreign-aﬀairs federalism accommodate that
political reality. The history they created was either imperial from ﬁrst
principles, or imperial in fact, in light of the unimaginable impracticability of
denying a power that had so evidently restructured the republic.323
If one looks to elite legal opinion in the short period before the Insular
Cases, the eﬀort to give a legal and historical imprimatur to the power of the
Id.
Id. at 220, 223. In earlier work, Tucker and his father previewed the argument that treaties
cannot “regulate the internal concerns of the country,” JOHN RANDOLPH TUCKER, 2
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 727 (Henry St. George Tucker ed. 1899), but assumed
that territory could be acquired “by . . . cession from a foreign power.” Id. at 730. They agreed,
moreover, that as to “the burning question of territorial expansion” raised in their own time,
including matters of “citizenship, statehood, etc.,” a long line of decisions established the “power of
Congress to govern the Territories of the United States.” Id. at 609 & n.1.
321 BROWN, supra note 97, at 196.
322 The Insular Cases is shorthand for a series of turn-of-the-century decisions in which the
Supreme Court “settled the question of whether the United States could hold colonies indeﬁnitely
(taking sides . . . with the imperialists).” Christina Duﬀy Burnett, A Convenient Constitution?
Extraterritoriality After Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 1041 (2009); see also Christina Duﬀy
Burnett & Burke Marshall, Between the Foreign and the Domestic, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC
SENSE, supra note 11, at 2 (describing this era’s invention of the idea of unincorporated territories).
On the question of the identity of the Insular Cases, see Burnett, supra, at 975 n. 4 (collecting sources
on the question of which cases should number among the “insular cases”). Histories of the Insular
Cases are ﬂourishing. See generally, e.g., ERMAN, supra note 11.
323 I owe this way of putting the point to Jean Galbraith.
319
320
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federal sovereign to acquire colonies by treaty comes into view. First, several
of the most prominent constitutional histories invoked the acquisition power
as a settled fait accompli of public law. Second, several prominent
constitutional professors expressed conﬁdence that courts would avoid the
acquisition and political-status questions raised by imperial conquest by
treating the whole ﬁeld as a “political question.” And ﬁnally, the relevant
bureaucrats and tastemakers of elite legal opinion heaped disdain on the
theory that American federalism limits American governments’ power to
acquire another sovereign state by treaty.
For example, in New Haven, Chief Judge Simeon Baldwin taught his
students the central lesson of the public-lands cases surveyed in the last Part of
this Article. He explained that the “U.S. has a police power, as to its land in a
State,”324 and after asking his students, “How far can [a treaty] alter State
domestic institutions?” he answered: “Land it has.”325 Baldwin also penned an
imperial history of the acquisition power for Congress. Months before the
annexation of Hawaii in 1898, Baldwin described the “Historic Policy of the
United States as to Annexation” and fully endorsed the power to acquire
territory.326 Baldwin also blessed the Louisiana Purchase as prudent, calling “for
action rather than deliberation.”327 The annexation of Louisiana was, moreover,
sanctioned by “the lips of our greatest Chief Justice, John Marshall” in Canter.328
Baldwin acknowledged that the question of “absor[bing] of a foreign
sovereignty” by acquiring Texas posed some diﬃculties, but he answered that
ordinary national elections—constitutional moments of a kind—had
sanctioned the acquisitions.329 Baldwin’s upshot was that the intense public
debate over the acquisition of Texas and its eventual settlement gave, as a
matter of accomplished fact, “the popular branch equal powers as to the
admission of a foreign State.”330 Baldwin then concluded by describing a
steady parade of acquisitions—Alaska, Arizona, California, New Mexico—to
demonstrate an unbroken practice sanctioning acquisition.331
Harvard professor James Bradley Thayer—who had once so labored to
rescue the idea of the “eminent domain” from its many abuses—joined his
324 Lecture Notes of Simeon Eben Baldwin 203 (on ﬁle with Baldwin Family Papers, Yale
MSSA, Group 55, Series VI, No. 202).
325 Id. at 238. He appended to this conclusion a question, presumably for class discussion:
“Land it has. Marriage?” Id.
326 SIMEON EBEN BALDWIN, THE HISTORIC POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES AS TO
ANNEXATION, S. REP. NO. 55-102, at 12 (1898).
327 Id. at 6.
328 Id.
329 Id. at 7.
330 Id. at 8.
331 See id. at 9-15 (explaining the many acquisitions made by the United States in the
nineteenth century).
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Yale colleague to defend the constitutional bona ﬁdes of imperial acquisition.
On November 17, 1898, The World newspaper telegraphed both professors and
asked whether the United States could “hold colonies” and what would be the
“status of natives of and residents in any territory that may become part of
the possessions of the United States?”332 Their answers ran together in print.
Baldwin replied with a précis of the history he sent to Congress: “the
United States can acquire territory by conquest or treaty in any part of the
world . . . .”333 Baldwin allowed that “the framers of the Constitution probably
did not contemplate a status intermediate between slavery and full citizenship”
but he noted that the Constitution did not forbid the exclusion of the insular
territories’ inhabitants from the union.334 Indeed, he continued, the Louisiana
Purchase proved that the government may annex “without paying much
deference to the desires of the inhabitants.”335 Like Baldwin, Thayer thought
that “the United States has the same power to acquire and to hold colonies
that any nation has. . . . The relation of colonies to the United States will be
just what the political department chooses to make it.”336 As to the status of
the territories, Thayer argued that there was no binding precedent: “The
United States . . . can give its colonies any form of government it chooses.”337
Thayer also famously published his imperial theory of acquisition in the
Harvard Law Review.338 His argument expounded a version of dual-sovereign
federalism in which all foreign-aﬀairs powers are vested in the federal
government. “If you ask what this nation may do in prosecuting the ends for
which it was created,” Thayer wrote, “the answer is, [i]t may do what other
sovereign nations may do.”339 Thayer denounced much of the angst about
acquiring insular territories as “crying over spilled milk,”340 and he took the
acquisition power to be so obvious as to require little elaboration.341

332 See Letter from The World editors to James Bradley Thayer (Nov. 17, 1898) (on ﬁle with
Harvard Law School Rare Book and Early Manuscript Library).
333 Simeon E. Baldwin, Letter to the Editor, WORLD, Nov. 20, 1898, at 4.
334 Id.
335 Id. Baldwin did, however, split from Thayer on the question whether the “constitution
follows the ﬂag” to the new territories. See FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 308, at 6
(describing Thayer’s and Baldwin’s contrasting views on incorporation).
336 James B. Thayer, Letter to the Editor, WORLD, Nov. 20, 1898, at 4.
337 Id.
338 James Bradley Thayer, Our New Possessions, 12 HARV. L. REV. 464 (1898). Thayer’s article
circulated widely. For example, John Davis Long, then Secretary of the Navy, wrote to express his
“special interest” in the article, and promised that he would lay it before the President. Letter from
John D. Long to James Bradley Thayer (Mar. 6, 1899) (on ﬁle with Harvard Law School Rare Books
and Early Manuscript Library). Long hoped the article would “really mould [sic] the trend of public
opinion as much as if [the professor] were in active political life.” Id.
339 Thayer, supra note 336, at 469.
340 Id. at 464.
341 Id. at 471.
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One important reader of Thayer’s defense of annexation was Moorﬁeld
Storey—an anti-imperialist and eventual founder of the NAACP. Storey’s
public opposition to the acquisition and imperial government of the insular
territories became a signiﬁcant irritant to President Theodore Roosevelt and
his Administration’s imperial government.342
Storey and Thayer shared a table at a Boston dinner party in 1899 and
debated whether Thayer’s writings about “our new possessions” could be
squared with the American theory of government.343 From Abraham
Lincoln’s speeches, Storey drew the argument that “[w]hen the white man
governs himself, that is self-government; but when he governs himself and
also governs another man . . . that is despotism.”344 Tackling Thayer’s
imperialism directly, Storey contended that the argument that the federal
government can do whatever other sovereigns can do misstates the
Constitution’s distribution of power from the popular sovereign to its
governments: “As against other nations the Federal government is
sovereign. . . . As against its own citizens and subjects its powers are
limited.”345 The question, he wrote, should instead be “what rights our agents,
the President and Congress, have as against the persons whom they govern:
what position we as a nation must take toward our citizens or subjects.”346
Thayer replied to Storey in a private letter, condescending to note that
“[i]n matters of State, as in life, it appears to me wiser and more helpful . . . to
keep one’s inner state wholesome and sweet with these things [i.e., the
Declaration of Independence], and then to turn in on his everyday practical
questions with all the horse-sense that he can muster.”347 Rather than embrace
the philosophy of government, Thayer counseled that “[i]n dealing with
342 President Roosevelt, for example, wrote a letter to his Secretary of War, Elihu Root, to
forward a letter he had received from Philippines Governor William Howard Taft. Taft described
Storey as being of a class of “men, who when they come to die will look back over their lives and be
unable to point out clearly any good which they have done to their fellow men . . . .” Letter from
Theodore Roosevelt, U.S. President, to Elihu Root, Sec’y of War (July 17, 1903) (on ﬁle with Library
of Congress, Elihu Root Papers, Special Correspondence). Taft reﬂected that these anti-imperialists
“despise most the men who are really accomplishing anything in the way of progressive improvement
of their race.” Id. Taft was conﬁdent that Root’s “great work” as Secretary of War would “be
remembered when the rhetorical mouthings of Moorﬁeld Story . . . will be buried in that oblivion
in which have been buried the utterances of so many self satisﬁed persons, who have been . . . utterly
lacking in a sense of historical or political proportion.” Id.
343 Letter from John Ropes to James Bradley Thayer 4 (Oct. 14, 1899) [hereinafter RopesThayer Letter] (on ﬁle with Harvard Law School Library) .
344 Letter from Moorﬁeld Storey to James Bradley Thayer 4 (Oct. 21, 1899) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (on ﬁle with Harvard Law School Rare Books Library, Thayer Collection,
Correspondence, Folder 18-17).
345 Id. at 6.
346 Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
347 Letter from James Bradley Thayer to Moorﬁeld Storey 1 (Oct. 27, 1899) (on ﬁle with
Harvard Law School Rare Books Library, Thayer Collection, Correspondence, Folder 18-17).
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practical questions we must deal with things as they are and build on what we
ﬁnd.”348 Thayer marshalled the “facts of three centuries” against Storey, and
argued that our late acquisition of “various islands” was “valid by
International Law. What Spain could do we can do.”349 Indeed, “[the] state of
things means colonial government. We are in for it, and can’t escape it.”350
For Thayer, the Constitution must be “read side by side with the fact that
it created a nation, with all the prodigious implications of that fact.”351 One
implication was more prodigious than the rest: “Much, under such an
instrument will be ‘unconstitutional but legal,’ . . . . Our protection
here . . . is in other things than courts.”352
By the end of the year in which Baldwin and Thayer penned their defenses
of annexation, the Secretary of War prefaced his report to the President on
“Insular Government” by “assum[ing], for I do not think that it can be
successfully disputed, that all acquisition of territory [by the United States
over the insular possessions] was the exercise of a power which belonged to
the United States, because it was a nation, and for that reason was endowed
with the powers essential to national life . . . .” 353 The obviousness of
annexation—and even annexation of other fully formed sovereignties—was
now expressed as settled wisdom: all sovereign powers, even imperial power,
must have been distributed to the federal government.
By 1900, a treatise on the constitutional law of the “public domain” (that
is, McKinley’s “eminent domain”) admitted that the “[i]nherent [p]ower of a
[n]ation to [a]cquire [t]erritory” had been one “of the great struggles between
political parties of the United States,” but explained that acquisition had been
settled as an “inherent power.”354 Although the acquisition of “disconnected”
territory stretched the inherent-power theory furthest,355 nevertheless “the
people of the United States, as sovereign owners . . . have supreme power
over [territories] and their inhabitants. In the exercise of this sovereign
dominion, they are represented by the government of the United States.”356
Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id. John Ropes wrote to Thayer after the dinner to agree with him on the question of
annexation: “In regard to our ‘constitutional power[]’ I never have had any diﬃculty . . . on that
score, and I suppose the only clause of the Constitution that applies . . . is the one which forbids
slavery.” Ropes-Thayer Letter, supra note 343, at 2.
353 Elihu Root, Report of the Secretary of War, in 1 ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE WAR
DEPARTMENT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1899, at 24, 24 (Washington, D.C., Gov’t
Printing Oﬀ. 1899).
354 JAMES DEWITT ANDREWS, A TREATISE ON THE JURISPRUDENCE, CONSTITUTION
AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 217 (1900) (emphasis omitted).
355 Id. at 223.
356 Id. at 230 (emphasis added).
348
349
350
351
352
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During the same period, the law oﬃcer of the War Department’s Insular
Aﬀairs Division prepared dozens of reports on the legal entanglements
created by the acquisition of the insular territories. In February 1900, he
submitted an elaborate report on the “Legal status of the territory and
inhabitants of the islands” America had conquered. He asserted plainly that
“[t]he United States derives the right to acquire territory from the fact that
it is . . . a sovereign nation. Such a nation has an inherent right to acquire
territory.”357 Indeed, consistent with its sovereignty, the acquisition of
territory simply increased the country’s landed wealth while leaving its
inhabitants outside of United States government: “The subsequent erection
[within acquired territory] of a political entity or government . . . and the
bestowal of citizenship upon the inhabitants are acts of grace on the part of
the new owner or sovereign.”358 As a sovereign conqueror possessed of the
eminent dominion, the “President . . . presents to Congress the territory of
said islands as so much property, seized as a spoil of war and to be dealt with
by the sovereign people of the United States as shall be determined by that
sovereign’s will.”359 In sum, the insular territories were part of the American
sovereign’s eminent dominion.
Like Thayer and Baldwin, the legal advisor concluded that dual-sovereign
federalism and the conservation-of-powers thesis made the federal
government’s foreign-aﬀairs power plenary. That is to say, “[i]n the
redistribution of sovereign powers made by the people . . . [the] National
Government exercises every sovereign power not expressly prohibited by the
Constitution, for the reason that the National Government in our
international relations represents the sovereign people; the States have no
international standing, powers, or existence.”360 The possibility that the
popular sovereign had reserved some of the sovereign powers described by
the law of nations—especially in determining the composition of the
American people—was purged from legitimate constitutional argument.
Seven months later, the legal advisor wrote another opinion to
supplement his treatment of the acquisition power based on a review of
“important incidents of our national history.”361 He turned ﬁrst to the
Louisiana Purchase. Jeﬀerson, like the modern administration, had to deal
with the accusation that he was an “imperialis[t],” and his opponents
357 2 CHARLES E. MAGOON, REPORTS ON THE LAW OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT IN
TERRITORY SUBJECT TO MILITARY OCCUPATION BY THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE UNITED
STATES 37 (3d ed. 1903) [hereinafter MAGOON, REPORTS] (citing Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S.
(1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828)) .
358 Id.
359 Id. at 48.
360 Id. at 68.
361 Id. at 121.
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“exhibited quite as much alarm as do the antiexpansionists of to-day.”362 In an
accurate recitation of the earlier legal theory opposing acquisition, the advisor
reported that at the time of the Louisiana Purchase, the idea that the
President, “exercising only the authority to make treaties,”363 could acquire
and incorporate territory “was declared to be absurd and a usurpation of
authority possessed by kings and kings’ councils.”364 And after reciting the
ﬂoor debates used by those who opposed the acquisition of Texas (Webster,
Story, and Channing), the advisor admitted that during earlier eras of
constitutional history, “no one believed that the President and Senate could
extend the boundaries of the United States by treaty stipulations, or
incorporate foreign territory into the United States . . . .”365 Indeed, in a
complete restatement of Massachusetts’s and Maine’s brand of federalism, the
legal advisor explained that “additions to the realm and the privilege of
participating in the Government were matters to be determined by the
sovereign, and that in the United States the sovereign was the people and not
the President or the Senate.”366
The advisor’s answer to the anti-imperialists’ theory of popular-sovereign
federalism was that politics had chosen a victor: “That Jeﬀerson was an
expansionist admits of no denial. His greatest glory was derived from the
acquisition of Louisiana . . . .”367 In the advisor’s view, Jeﬀerson’s election
furnished a constitutional moment that blessed the propriety of acquiring
territory by treaty and subjecting its inhabitants’ political status to Congress’s
legislative power. By presidential election, “[t]he course pursued by
[Jeﬀerson] in the acquisition and government of Louisiana was submitted to
the people,” and Jeﬀerson won overwhelmingly.368 Accordingly, the advisor
concluded that now the “great power of the sovereign was vested . . . in the
people,” and—crucially—that “[t]he will of the sovereign people in regard [to
acquisition and government of new territory] was to be declared by the
legislative department of the [federal] Government.”369
The Insular Bureau’s use of the law-of-nations idea of eminent dominion
was not clean, however. Just a year prior, the same legal advisor had opined
that once the fact of annexation was accomplished, the Constitution must
then apply, by its own force, in the acquired territory. That is to say, once the
war of conquest ended, the federal government would “cease[] to derive its
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369

Id.
Id. at 122.
Id.
Id. at 128.
Id.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 128 (emphasis added).
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authority from the laws and usages of war,” and would instead “bec[o]me
subject to the Constitution and laws of the United States.”370 Remarkably, the
advisor quoted Justice McKinley’s treatment of the eminent dominion in
Hagan for the proposition that acquired territory must be held “subject to the
constitution and laws of [the American sovereign’s] own government.”371 In
short, when the Insular Bureau’s lawyer ﬁrst addressed the question of the
possession’s legal status, he concluded that the Constitution would follow the
ﬂag: the insular possessions were “now a civil government, subject to and
controlled by the Constitution and Federal laws of the United States.”372
The advisor’s apparent about-face concerning the application of the
Constitution to the insular territories became public when an anti-imperialist
Congressman quoted the earlier opinion on the ﬂoor. That member opposed
the developing colonial policy, which included diﬀerential tariﬀs on goods
from the new territories, by arguing that the President’s party intended to
“convert this Republic into an empire in fact.”373 In response to the ﬂoor
statements and an oﬃcial request for the earlier opinion concluding that the
Constitution follows the ﬂag, the War Department furnished the opinion to
Congress with the caveat that it had been deemed to be “not . . . well
founded.”374 The War Department and Congress ordered the Insular Bureau’s
legal opinions published in the summer of 1902, to the approval of signiﬁcant
taste-makers of legal culture.375
Most signiﬁcantly, the Insular Bureau’s archival records contain a seventysix page document bearing a handwritten notation that the “undated and
unsigned” memorandum was “probably” composed “by Sec’y of War [Elihu]
Root.”376 The document concerned “the rights of U.S. to hold and govern
newly acquired territory.”377 As described in what follows, that memorandum
describes the culmination of the ideological development traced in the
foregoing Parts: it advanced the arguments that the federal government, not
the states, holds a sovereign’s eminent dominion; that in matters of foreign
370 CHARLES E. MAGOON, RELATIONS OF PUERTO RICO TO THE CONSTITUTION, H.R.
Doc. No. 56-594, reprinted in ELIHU ROOT COLLECTION OF UNITED STATES DOCUMENTS, SER.
A.-F., 815, 829 (Washington, D.C., Gov’t Printing Oﬀ. 1895) [hereinafter MAGOON, RELATIONS].
371 MAGOON, REPORTS, supra note 357, at 188 (citing Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (1
How.) 212, 225 (1845); VATTEL, supra note 68, at bk. 1, ch. 19, s. 210, 244, 250).
372 MAGOON, RELATIONS, supra note 370, at 829.
373 34 CONG. REC. 1555 (1901) (statement of Sen. Towne).
374 33 CONG. REC. 4063 (1900) (statement of Assistant Sec’y of War G.D. Meiklejohn).
375 See, e.g., Our Colonial Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1902, at 503.
376 Memorandum (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter War Department Memo] (on ﬁle
with NARA RG 350, Stack 150, Compartment 8, Shelf 4, Box 197, Doc. No. 1444-9). The document
also bears a clerk’s stamp dated April 13, 1904, which accords with Root’s tenure as Secretary. On
Root’s creation of a legal theory permitting an “imperial household with Puerto Rican dependents,”
see ERMAN, supra note 11, at 40. See also id. at 41 n.40 (also attributing the memorandum to “Root?”).
377 War Department Memo, supra note 376, back page.
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aﬀairs the federal government is properly conceived of as an absolute sovereign
in which all powers at international law are reposed; and that from these
premises it follows that the federal sovereign holds a power of acquiring
territory and practicing colonial government within it.
The ﬁrst half of the memorandum is devoted to a question that “at ﬁrst
sight seem[s] to present unsurmountable diﬃcult[y]”378—that is, the source
of the power of the federal government to acquire territory notwithstanding
the Constitution’s silence regarding that power. The memorandum argued
that a century of practice as well as Marshall’s early opinion in Canter
“necessarily remove[d] all these apparent complications . . . and clearly
demonstrate[d] the absolute power of the National Government, not only to
acquire, but also to subsequently govern, all territory which may come under
its jurisdiction in any manner whatsoever.”379 To resolve the constitutional
“complication,” the memorandum explained, it was necessary to bear in mind
a central distinction “between the control of matters which belong to the
separate States”—as to which the “United States are a federation”380—and the
“control by Congress of matters aﬀecting the general property which belongs
to all the States”381—as to which the federal government acts as a trustee.
Because Congress controls the eminent dominion as a “nation,” the
memorandum continued, all constitutional “limitations so far as the central
government is concerned . . . cannot relate to the control of territory and
property which belongs to the United States as a whole.”382
Once this federal eminent dominion was fully accepted, the memorandum
continued, it was possible to understand three related propositions: (1) the
power to acquire territory; (2) the constitutional power of Congress to govern
“such acquired territory”; and (3) the status of the inhabitants with respect to
“the United States as a governing power.”383
Turning ﬁrst to “the right of the United States to acquire new territory,”
the memorandum cautioned that “before the source of the right . . . can be
clearly understood, it is necessary to thoroughly appreciate what the
Government of the United States is . . . .”384 The answer, the author
explained, turned on what I have labeled dual-sovereign federalism and the
conservation-of-powers thesis: with respect to “those matters . . . over which
no particular state can exercise any control,” the federal government “as vested
in, and wielded by, Congress and the Executive, is an absolutely sovereign power,
378
379
380
381
382
383
384

Id. at 1.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
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subject only to” the Constitution’s express limitations.385 Such limitations “are
very few,” such as the right of habeas corpus or, after the Thirteenth
Amendment, a prohibition on “the institution of slavery in any form.”386
The author admitted that his “declaration of the absolute sovereignty of
Congress may for a moment appear startling and even repugnant,” but he
countered that “a moment’s reﬂection” reveals that “there is nothing whatever
derogatory to the dignity or prejudicial to the interests of any State, in
granting the fullest possible power over foreign relations or territorial matters
to the Central Government.”387 To be sure, states “can well be jealous” of their
“sovereignty over their own internal aﬀairs,” but as to matters that are
“conducted by Congress for the general good of the Union,” the institutions
of federal government must possess plenary power.388
Root thought that any alternative version of foreign-affairs federalism
would be absurd because unless the federal sovereign holds a plenary foreignaffairs power (here expressed as a national treaty-making power to acquire
territory), any alternative distribution of sovereignty would “necessarily
result[] in a diminution or loss of sovereignty to the general Government, and
thereby the entire Union, which can never be restored.”389 Indeed, identifying
the argument that a power might have been withheld from all American
governments by a popular sovereign—that is, the central claim of
Massachusetts’ or Maine’s popular-sovereign federalism—was, in the author’s
view, enough to disprove it: such an argument would leave the national
government “in the undignified position of being less than a sovereign state
and not able to negotiate in regard thereto.”390 Extensively quoting a midnineteenth-century Attorney General’s opinion, the memorandum
emphasized that “if the power of negotiation be not in the United States, then
it exists nowhere, and one great field of international relation . . . is closed
up . . . .”391 Crucially, therefore, it followed that “[t]his element of complete
sovereignty as to all matters other than th[o]se in which the States themselves
are separately interested . . . can be exercised in a thoroughly effective manner
only by a supreme Government possessed of absolutely complete sovereignty.”392
Indeed, the memorandum continued, “in regard to all such matters as are now
under consideration”393—that is, the power to acquire territory by treaty and
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
Id. (quoting 8 Op. Att’y. Gen., 411, 415 (1857)) (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
Id. at 18.
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Congress’s power to govern it as a colony—the United States “is a sovereign
nation, and . . . its Central Government has powers which are co-extensive
with the power of any other sovereign nation, no matter what its form of
government may be, whether autocratic, limited monarchy, or republican.”394
The treaty-making power was thus national and imperial: it expressed a
vision of the federal government’s sovereignty that is so absolute—and so
disconnected from the conceit of popular sovereignty—that it could even be
autocratic or imperial.
The War Department’s defense of imperial acquisition and government
aligned with elite legal opinion of the time. By 1912, Secretary of War Henry
Stimson was recommending citizenship for Puerto Rican inhabitants but
cautioned that “the grant of citizenship does not, and should not postulate
eventual statehood . . . .”395 His Legal Advisor, Felix Frankfurter, similarly
advised the Attorney General of Puerto Rico, “I feel very strongly that if the
public opinion of this country is against statehood . . . our dealings with the
Island . . . will be furthered by a frank, even an unnecessarily frank, statement
of our intentions.”396 The “frank” statement that the territory would never
become a state “will serve to build up a tradition against any possible partisan
temptation of the future” while “prevent[ing] the raising of false hopes”
among Puerto Ricans.397 And, of course, the idea of imperial government and
the doctrine of incorporation of conquered territory eventually received the
sanction of the Supreme Court in the Insular Cases.
But in the interstices of insular government, the conceit that the popular
sovereign might reserve some powers from its governments recurred.
For example, just after the conquest of Puerto Rico but before Congress
had legislated a municipal code for the territory, insular authorities had to
determine whether corporations could be created during the interregnum.398
So, when several Puerto Rican beer-making entrepreneurs applied to create a
corporation with special immunities from taxation,399 the insular authorities
demurred, citing Hagan: “When Porto Rico was ceded to the United States
Id. (emphasis added).
Henry Stimson, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, in 1 WAR DEPARTMENT ANNUAL
REPORTS, 1912, at 5, 42 (1913).
396 Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Dep’t of War Legal Adviser, to Foster V. Brown, Att’y Gen.
of P.R. 1 (Dec. 29, 1911) (on ﬁle with National Archives, NARA RG 350, Entry 16, Stack 150, Row
57, Compartment 24, Shelf 3).
397 Id. at 1-2.
398 See In re Application of Frank H. Griswold, No. 443, Division of Insular Aﬀairs, War
Department (June 14, 1899), in MAGOON, REPORTS, supra note 357, at 490 (addressing an
application for proposed brewing company’s incorporation in Puerto Rico).
399 Id. at 491 (“Among other special privileges sought to be secured by these proposed articles of
incorporation is one to be allowed to conduct the business of manufacturing and selling malt, spirituous,
and vinous liquors ‘without paying any special tax assessed against it or its property.’” (citation omitted)).
394
395
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our Federal Government did not succeed to the prerogatives . . . inherent in
the Crown of Spain under the monarchy. Our Federal Government has never
been authorized to receive or . . . secure said prerogatives by transfer from a
monarch or otherwise . . . .”400 Because no federal oﬃcer could inherit the
powers of a Spanish bureaucrat, the insular authorities continued, no
corporate charters could be granted.401 The adviser admonished the public
that “attention is directed to the fact that the conqueror in this instance is the
sovereign people of the United States,” and accordingly Congress would have
to permit corporate charters.402
As another example, after the American government’s conquest of the
Philippines, the Manila Railway Company applied for past-due interest
payments guaranteed by the Crown.403 While the insular authorities admitted
that a “sovereignty securing the territory secures all the rights and privileges
and assumes all the obligations of the previous sovereign,” they concluded
that this doctrine was “inaccurate” in the United States.404 This law-ofnations doctrine, they reasoned, does not extend to the United States because
of the “character of [American] government.”405 It was “impossible” for the
United States government to acquire the rights and obligations of a monarch,
since it was diﬀerent in form to the foreign sovereign.406
The Insular Bureau’s position on corporate charters and interest payments
was consistent, of course, with the superseded legal opinion on whether the
Constitution follows the ﬂag: if the Constitution displaced the law of nations
after conquest, then international law was inapt. Thus, relying on Hagan, the
legal oﬃcer could contend that no American government could receive the
sovereign prerogatives of another sovereign by the contrivance of a treaty.
The Insular Bureau’s varied positions on the federal government’s powers
in the territories rendered the Bureau’s calculus of imperial public law
confused: in what way, precisely, was the federal government “sovereign” over
these possessions?
Ultimately, the contradiction between the insular authorities’ invocation of
the sovereign’s acquisition power, on the one hand, and a limited federal
government, on the other, yielded the general theory that the creature that
conquered the insular territories could act as a sovereign but not as a government.
Id. at 493 (citing Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (1 How.) 212, 235 (1845)).
Id. at 494.
Id. at 495.
See In re Claim of the Manila Ry. Co., No. 849, Division of Insular Affairs, War Department
(Dec. 21, 1899), in MAGOON, REPORTS, supra note 357, at 178 (responding to the Manila Railway
Company’s request for “payment by the United States of interest on the capital invested in the railway
owned and operated by said company, pursuant to guarantee of said interest by the Spanish Government”).
404 Id. at 188.
405 Id.
406 Id.
400
401
402
403
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More generally, as these interregnum decisions of the Insular Bureau
demonstrate, the compatibility of American government with the law-ofnations idea of the eminent dominion became a central point of dispute about
the limits on the government’s treaty-making and foreign-aﬀairs powers.
Thayer and the War Department’s lawyers’ imperial views reﬂected the
political realities of their time, and foreshadowed the settlement that the main
treaty-power histories would parrot a decade later.407 That is to say, American
federalism was by then framed by dual sovereignty, and the new histories
assigned all law-of-nations powers to an “absolute” federal sovereign.
3. The Imperial Dominion in The New Insular Cases
Given the evidence that several of the most inﬂuential early-twentiethcentury histories of the treaty power embraced the brute fact of imperial
government, what are we to make of eminent-dominion problems that
continue to arise in America’s overseas territories? To be sure, the
forthrightness with which these public lawyers embraced the fact of imperial
acquisition is, across the distance of time, diﬃcult to judge by their lights and
their politics. But it is imperative that we judge them by our lights, since the
sovereignty of the newest possessions remains an open question.
In deciding the 2016 case Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, for example, the
Court charged once more into the breach between sovereignty and
government to answer a straightforward question: should the Constitution’s
double-jeopardy clause protect defendants in Puerto Rico in the same
(limited) way that it protects citizens of ordinary states?408
In Sanchez Valle, the respondents had been indicted for offenses arising from
the same course of conduct by both Commonwealth and federal grand juries.409
After pleading guilty to the federal charges, they contended that the
Commonwealth’s charges were now barred by the Fifth Amendment’s Double
Jeopardy Clause.410 Their conviction of the federal crime, they argued, prohibited
their being put in jeopardy once more for the “same offense.”411 The
Commonwealth replied that like any other American state, it should be considered
a “different separate sovereign[] for dual-jeopardy purposes,” and therefore it
could prosecute the respondents regardless of the federal conviction.412

See infra Section III.B.
See 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2016) (“In this case, we must decide if . . . Puerto Rico and the
United States may successively prosecute a single defendant for the same criminal conduct.”).
409 Id. at 1869.
410 Id.
411 Id. at 1870.
412 Id. at 1869.
407
408
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Six members of the Court decided that Puerto Rico was not a government
possessing sovereignty of the right kind to entitle it to the separate-sovereign
exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause.413 The Court’s majority opinion
rests almost entirely on a peculiar history of the eminent dominion.
In the opening paragraphs of its opinion, the Sanchez Valle Court found
that Puerto Rico was not a sovereign for dual-jeopardy purposes because “the
oldest roots of Puerto Rico’s power to prosecute lie in federal soil.”414 What
follows is a dispassionate recitation of the federal conquest and annexation of
the territory, Congress’s beneﬁcent but halting authorization of “selfgovernance,” and ﬁnally the creation of “a new political entity.”415 All of this
“historical, not functional”416 evidence proved, the Court said, that the right
of soil over Puerto Rico—the eminent dominion—was federal.417 Most
remarkably, given the vexed origins of the new states’ eminent dominion, the
Sanchez Valle majority decided that Puerto Rico’s status as a political entity
did not accord with the “ordinary” meaning of sovereignty.418
Ultimately, the Court decided that, notwithstanding its practical
functioning as a state, the government failed a “historical” test of its “ultimate
source of . . . power”: Puerto Rican sovereignty is lesser than that sovereignty
exercised by the former territories now made states of the union.419 The
authorities cited by the Court for that proposition, in turn, rest expressly on
the eminent-dominion principle that Justice McKinley advanced in Hagan:
the “new” states were “admitted with all the powers of sovereignty and
jurisdiction which pertain to the original states.”420
In its historicist understanding of insular government, the Court could
not have provided a clearer summary of the earlier views of the eminent
dominion—that federal soil, dominion, jurisdiction, and sovereignty are
coextensive. As we have seen, the “ordinary” and “historical” meaning of
federal sovereignty over soil—that is, the eminent dominion—was
profoundly contested, especially when the historical aperture is opened to
take in the nineteenth-century debates over the acquisition, cession, and title
to land. In Puerto Rico’s case, as War Department lawyers and pro-imperial

Id. at 1876.
Id. at 1868.
Id. at 1868-69.
Id. at 1871.
See id. at 1874-75 (“[T]he dual-sovereignty test . . . focuses on . . . where [self-rule] came
from. . . . On this settled approach, Puerto Rico cannot benefit from our dual-sovereignty doctrine.”).
418 Id. at 1870.
419 Id.
420 Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 573 (1911).
413
414
415
416
417
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academics aimed to make certain, what the Court called the “deepest
wellsprings”421 of Puerto Rico’s authority was a “sovereign” Congress.422
As we have seen, the doctrinal settlements on which the modern Court
relied were motivated, in turn, by a desire to wrest dominion from the federal
government in the mid-nineteenth century and the desire to elevate the fait
accompli of imperial government into the constitutional canon in the earlytwentieth. In attending to only the victors of the earlier constitutional battles,
the Court’s “historical” approach to determining whether the possessions’
inhabitants enjoy the practical rights of living under local American
government (as against subjection to federal sovereignty) is dubious.
Yet, in light of Sanchez Valle, the Court’s historicist gloss now defines the
political status of persons governed by a federal dominus.423 If one takes the
Court’s historicist conceit seriously, it is far from clear why the federal
government’s exercise of eminent dominion in acquiring the insular territories
is not identical in kind to the original source of power by which the new states—
like Illinois or Alabama—flowed into the United States. The new states, like
the insular possessions, grew from the federal sovereign’s confident embrace of
its power of eminent dominion. Indeed, they entered the union despite
Massachusetts’s argument that the “disposition of its sovereignty” cannot be “a
subject of barter by governments,”424 and despite never obtaining the
“sovereignty” they claimed over public land held by the federal government.
To be sure, the Sanchez Valle majority advanced an answer to the
“literalist”425 objection that the new states, no less than the insular territories,
have “roots” in “federal soil.”426 The Court’s answer was Justice McKinley’s
answer in Hagan.427 As in Hagan, the Court held that the admission of the
Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1871.
Id. at 1874.
See id. at 1871 n.3 (noting that “[t]he Court has never explained its reasons for adopting this
historical approach to the dual-sovereignty doctrine,” but ﬁnding nevertheless that a diﬀerent
approach that would focus on the local government’s “functional autonomy” “would raise serious
problems of application”).
424 COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., supra note 103, at 23 (ﬁrst emphasis added).
425 See Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1871 n.4 (countering the “literalist” objection by citing
principles of “equal footing” and “fundamental conceptual premises of our constitutional order” as
justiﬁcation for granting equal sovereignty powers to states admitted after the original thirteen).
426 A version of the historical argument against the majority’s opinion appears in Justice
Breyer’s dissent. See id. at 1879 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he equal-footing doctrine means
that . . . new States must enjoy the same rights and obligations as the original
States . . . . [But] there is a federal ‘source’ from which those rights and obligations spring: the
Congress which agreed to admit those new States into the Union in accordance with the
Constitution’s terms.”).
427 Justice Kagan’s majority opinion cited Coyle v. Smith as the source of an equal sovereignty
principle. See Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1872 n.4 (highlighting that “the very meaning of ‘a State’ is
found in the powers possessed by the original States which adopted the Constitution” (quoting Coyle
v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 566 (1911) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Justice Lurton’s opinion in
421
422
423
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new states into the union invested them with the eminent dominion—a
confused bric-a-brac of sovereignty, jurisdiction, title, and soil. “[E]ach lateradmitted State exercises its authority to enact and enforce criminal laws by
virtue not of congressional grace, but of the independent powers that [their]
earliest counterparts both brought to the Union and chose to maintain.”428
The more vexed history of the United States’ century of acquiring new
territory and admitting new states from that territory thus obscured, the
Sanchez Valle majority could freely argue that the new states’ sovereignty
follows from “the most fundamental conceptual premises of our
constitutional order, indeed the very bedrock of our Union.”429
It has been nearly two hundred years since Ninian Edwards and Justice
McKinley invented their theory of the eminent-dominion in an eﬀort to wrest
title to the public land away from the federal government. They lost. But the
ideological apparatus they injected into the U.S. Reports—of a dualsovereigntist theory of the eminent dominion—now serves as the principle
distinguishing the new states from the imperial colonies. The Court now
looks upon federal dominion over the insular territories not with Thayer’s
practical “horse-sense”—that is, by asking what powers they now exercise as
a matter of fact—but rather with his admonition that the territories’
“protection . . . is in other things than courts.”430
B. Treaty-Making Without Absolute Dual Sovereignty
The passage of the problem of conquest and annexation from
constitutional aporia to accomplished fact in the early-twentieth century
settled only that era’s most vexing practical question about the scope of the
treaty-making power. Elihu Root’s peculiar framing of the treaty-making
power—that is, asking whether the treaty-making power’s evident nationality
(as against the states) also makes it imperial—must assume, ﬁrst, that no
popular sovereign reserved the power of practicing imperial government away
from its government. Indeed, for Root and lawyers of his generation, the
nationality of the treaty-making power funded the conclusion that the federal
government’s foreign-aﬀairs powers are “co-extensive” with every other
nation—even “autocratic” or “monarchical” imperial sovereigns.
To be sure, Root admitted that the treaty-making power could not
recreate a slave-holding republic or suspend habeas corpus, but these “very
Coyle, in turn, expressly recites Justice McKinley’s opinion in Hagan. See Coyle, 221 U.S. at 573 (“The
plain deduction from this case is that when a new State is admitted into the Union, it is so admitted
with all of the powers of sovereignty and jurisdiction which pertain to the original States . . . .”).
428 Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1872 n.4 (citing Coyle, 221 U.S. at 573).
429 Id.
430 Letter from James Bradley Thayer to Moorﬁeld Storey, supra note 347, at 4.
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few” limitations follow only from the express terms of the Suspension Clause
and the Thirteenth Amendment. Root’s imperial view was that the federal
government’s “full and completely sovereign rights have but the single
limitation—that those personal and natural rights which all individuals
possess, and the preservation of which is the object of all honestly conducted
governments, cannot be destroyed.”431
Yet, as we have seen, the move from a national treaty-making power to an
imperial one was neither obvious nor historically straightforward. Contrary to
Root’s imperial project, could one accept the evident nationality of the treatymaking power—as against the states—without accepting the supremacy of the
treaty-making power as against the popular sovereign? In other words, what
would the treaty-making power look like if it were taken to be plausible that
some law-of-nations powers were denied to all American governments by
their popular sovereign?
In light of the larger history of the eminent-dominion powers traced in
this Article, we should rethink the frame through which we currently debate
the scope of the treaty-making power. In this ﬁnal subpart, I return to the
question whether and how the treaty-making power should be limited.
1. The Eminent Dominion in Missouri v. Holland
As I have argued, while it is now thought that Chief Justice Marshall
resolved for good the question of whether the federal government possesses
the eminent-dominion power to acquire and hold title to territory, the
historical record simply does not bear this out—the issue was central to thirty
years of constitutional debate after Marshall’s engagement with the issue and
was a persistent feature of late-nineteenth-century anti-imperialism. And
while it is now thought that the federal government’s treaty-making power has
not once been limited in fact,432 the public law litigation of earlier eras suggests
that this article of faith about the treaty power is untrue. But of course the
early decades of the twentieth century brought the Supreme Court’s principal
discussion of the treaty power, in the 1920 decision Missouri v. Holland.433
Today, Holland remains the single modern case that defines the federal
government’s capacity to legislate pursuant to the treaty power434—a decision

War Department Memo, supra note 376, at 18.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 312 n.1 (AM. LAW
INST. 2018) (“The Supreme Court has never held that a treaty exceeded the powers of the national
government or unconstitutionally invaded the reserved powers of the States.”).
433 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
434 Id.
431
432
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that “set off a maelstrom that has ebbed and flowed for over nine decades,”
including the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Bond v. United States.435
Crucially, Holland emerged from deeper currents of constitutional
reasoning about the sovereign’s eminent dominion—its power to acquire,
cede, and hold title to property—traced throughout this Article. In the
remaining pages, I aim to demonstrate that Holland was in fact a waystation
between a world in which it was plausible for constitutional partisans to joust
about which sovereign (popular, federal, or state) holds the eminent
dominion, and the emergence of the now-dominant theory of dual-sovereign
foreign-aﬀairs federalism. The latter theory of dual-sovereign federalism—
embraced by proponents of an imperial, nationalist treaty-making power and
states-rights critics of the treaty-making power alike—has struggled to oﬀer
an intelligible theory of the treaty power’s limits ever since.
The beginning of the Holland controversy is usually dated to 1904, when
Congress ﬁrst undertook an “active eﬀort . . . to gain federal protection for
migratory birds.”436 Congress passed ordinary legislation that was held
unconstitutional in various lower courts.437 Undaunted, Congress passed a
similar statute pursuant to a treaty regulating the same subject matter.438 This
commonplace brief of the case suggests a dual-sovereigntist frame for the
constitutional question presented: the state and the federal sovereigns
advanced competing claims to a “police power,” on the one hand, and “implied
attributes of sovereignty,” on the other, that collided in a debate about
whether the federal government could regulate bird hunting within the
states.439 Thus, the proponents of the federal statute are thought to have
invoked a “plenary national power in foreign aﬀairs” to displace the states’
power to act as “trustees . . . of animals . . . within their boundaries.”440
On the nationalist view of the treaty power, Congress’s passage of the
statute pursuant to a treaty engaged a broader fund of absolute sovereign
power. As George Sutherland put it just before his elevation to the Supreme
Court, Elihu Root had it right: “the treaty-making power was never possessed
or exercised by the states separately . . . whatever else may be reserved to the
states by the Tenth Amendment, no part of the treaty-making power can
possibly be included.”441 Indeed, Sutherland continued, it was a mistake to
consider the treaty-making power to be “distributed” at all: “it is all vested in
Hathaway et al., supra note 6, at 13.
Charles A. Lofgren, Missouri v. Holland in Historical Perspective, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 78.
GEORGE SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS 154-55 (1918)
(citing United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288 (1915)).
438 See Galbraith, supra note 11, at 66-67.
439 Lofgren, supra note 436, at 78-79.
440 Id. at 79.
441 SUTHERLAND, supra note 437, at 156 (emphasis added).
435
436
437
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the National government.”442 Accordingly, “its full exercise necessarily
devolves upon the general government as the only possible agency . . . .”443
Sutherland and Root’s history of Holland thus puts the powers of two
sovereign governments in opposition: should the plenary federal treatymaking power or the state police power win out?444
The Oﬃce of the Attorney General of Missouri, whose head had been
charged with violating the “bird bill,” joined a suit challenging the statute
before the Supreme Court. His oﬃce framed Missouri’s case using the
language of the sovereign’s eminent dominion. Indeed, what is most
important about Holland is the extent to which the case represented the last
chapter of the eminent-dominion argument traced throughout this Article.
Missouri’s brief set out to “revive . . . the atmosphere breathed by those
who framed . . . the Constitution of the United States.”445 The most
important ambient idea to be revived was the eminent dominion: “Under the
ancient law, feudal law, and the common law . . . the absolute control of wild
game was an attribute of government and a necessary incident of
sovereignty.”446 Missouri’s argument was thus that its own “trust
right . . . [in] the title to all wild game” foreclosed a treaty that would
regulate the birds.447 By virtue of its eminent dominion, Missouri had title to
the birds. And, as McKinley had established in Hagan, “Missouri, upon her
admission to the Union, . . . became entitled to and possessed of all the rights
and dominion and sovereignty which belonged to the original states.”448
Replacing “wild game” with “overﬂowed lands” in Missouri’s brief would
make it accord exactly with the question at issue in Hagan in 1845.449 Missouri
took itself to be making a straightforward Hagan argument: like the tidelands,
title to the birds vested in the states by virtue of their eminent dominion.

Id. at 157 (adopting language that Sutherland attributed to Root).
Id.
Sutherland sent this history to the Senator who authored the migratory bird statutes, who
in turn replied that since the act had been passed, “[t]he Attorney-General of Missouri has been
prosecuted for shooting ducks out of season . . . .” Letter from George P. McLean, U.S. Senator, to
George Sutherland (June 2, 1919) (on ﬁle with Library of Congress, George Sutherland Papers,
General Correspondence, Box 1). The Senator promised to forward Sutherland’s views to the U.S.
Attorney to aid his defense of the statute’s constitutionality. Id.
445 Brief of Appellant at 18, Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (No. 609).
446 Id. at 27.
447 Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted).
448 Id. at 28-29 (citing Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845)).
449 Similarly, replacing “wild game” with “separate sovereignty” in Missouri’s brief would
make its argument accord with the majority’s explication of the diﬀerence between the insular
possessions and the “new” states in Sanchez Valle. See supra text accompanying notes 425–427.
442
443
444
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Viewed against this backdrop, Justice Holmes’s majority opinion in Holland
does not seem as gaunt as modern commentators have suggested.450 Holmes’s
critical move was to reject Missouri’s eminent-dominion argument out of hand.
Despite hundreds of pages of briefing on the subject, Holmes noted only in
passing that “[t]he State also alleges a pecuniary interest” in the birds.451 The
limits of the treaty power, Holmes concluded, must be “ascertained in a
different way.”452 While a state may “regulate the killing and sale of [migratory]
birds, . . . it does not follow that its authority is exclusive of paramount powers
[in the federal government]. To put the claim of the State upon title is to lean
upon a slender reed.”453 Whatever had been reserved to the states by American
federalism, Holmes held, it was not a sovereign’s “eminent dominion.”
In a pregnant omission, Holmes left the question of sovereignty in
suspense: “We must consider what this country has become in deciding what
[the Tenth] amendment has reserved.”454 Thus, in a terse holding that has
infuriated his skeptics, Holmes concluded that the states’ interests must give
way. Migratory birds represent “a national interest of very nearly the ﬁrst
magnitude . . . . It can be protected only by national action in concert with
that of another power.”455 Because treaties can solve “matters of the sharpest
exigency for the national well being,”456 the treaty power ought to supplement
Congress’s ordinary legislative powers.
In short, Holmes rejected Missouri’s claim to a sovereign’s dominion over
the birds, and thus Justice McKinley’s exotic argument drawn from the law of
nations was eclipsed by a pragmatist’s view of government.
There is more evidence, beyond the briefs, that underscores the extent to
which Holland distanced the Court from the idea of dual-sovereign eminent
dominion. Two weeks before Holland was argued, Tucker sent his abovedescribed anti-“nationalist” history of the treaty power to Justice
McReynolds. In his letter, Tucker noted that the Court’s work “promises to
be quite important—especially in respect to the proposed League of
Nations.”457 Tucker confessed that he was “look[ing] to your Court to give to
us our Constitutional form of Government—you are in fact our tabula in

450 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 873-74 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing
the critical holding of Missouri v. Holland as an “unreasoned and citation-less sentence” and “ipse dixit”).
451 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 431 (1920).
452 Id. at 433.
453 Id. at 434 (emphasis added).
454 Id.
455 Id. at 435.
456 Id. at 433.
457 Letter from Henry St. George Tucker to James McReynolds, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme
Court (Feb. 17, 1920) (on ﬁle with Library of the Supreme Court of the United States).
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naufragio” and encouraged the Justice to look to Chapters IV and V of his
history for an argument against a national view of the treaty-making power.458
Justice McReynolds replied to thank Tucker for the book, and about a
month later—less than a week before Holland was decided—Tucker wrote
again. Tucker was more direct, and encouraged McReynolds to review
“Chapter 4 of the book . . . especially Paragraph 70.”459 In that paragraph,
Tucker advanced the modern critique of Missouri v. Holland: the treaty power
must be constrained to avoid “annihilat[ing] others equally important and
equally supreme.”460 Because treaties can encompass anything, a broad view of
the federal government’s treaty-making power “may embrace every right or
power of the people, pertaining not only to their national but to their State and
local rights.”461 Accordingly, to say that the treaty-making power “may include
the rights and powers of the citizens of the States not granted to the Federal
government . . . is to claim a superiority for that power over the powers of the
[other branches], and the powers of the States, which are equally supreme with
the treaty-making power.”462 The seed Tucker aimed to plant with McReynolds
did not take root, as McReynolds joined the Court’s decision upholding the
Migratory Bird Act pursuant to the treaty-making power.463
2. The Dual-Sovereign Treaty Power in Bond v. United States
Although Tucker failed to convince McReynolds, the Court’s more recent
work suggests that Tucker may have found the “tabula in naufragio” to vindicate
his dual-sovereigntist—but anti-nationalist—theory of the treaty-making
power. Tucker’s approach found its way into several Justices’ concurrences in
Bond v. United States, which raised renewed skepticism about whether the
treaty power should enlarge Congress’s ordinary legislative powers.
On its facts, the problem posed in Bond would appear as innocuous as
hunting out-of-season birds in Missouri. After discovering marital infidelity, a
spouse spread toxic chemicals on surfaces that her spouse’s paramour was likely
to touch, in an effort to give the paramour a rash.464 A prosecutor charged the
spouse with violating a statute passed by Congress to implement the Chemical

Id.
Letter from Henry St. George Tucker to James McReynolds, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme
Court (Apr. 10, 1920) (on ﬁle with Library of the Supreme Court of the United States).
460 TUCKER, supra note 309, at 79.
461 Id.
462 Id.
463 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 430 (1920).
464 Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 852 (2014).
458
459
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Weapons Convention, 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1), and contended that the statute
accorded with federalism because it was passed pursuant to a treaty.465
A majority of the Court in Bond avoided the federalism puzzle in this
“unusual case” by ﬁnding the term “chemical weapon” in the statute to be too
unclear to permit prosecution for such “local crimes.”466 In concurring in the
judgment, however, three Justices criticized the majority for avoiding the
federalism problem by way of strained statutory interpretation.
Instead of avoiding the constitutional question, all three concurring Justices
would have found that the statute obviously applied to the spouse’s conduct and
thought that the Court should not shirk its duty to address the resultant
federalism concerns.467 To that end, Justice Scalia quoted, at length, from the
“famous scholar and jurist Henry St. George Tucker” to demonstrate that the
danger of Holland’s view of the treaty power was clear “five years before
[Holland] was written.”468 (As we have seen, this was no hypothetical; Tucker
sent his work to Justice McReynolds twice in connection with Missouri v.
Holland.469) Scalia’s concurrence then adopted Tucker’s dual-sovereign frame—
that the dual spheres of state and federal sovereignty must be rebalanced—to
argue that Congress could not pass the Chemical Weapons Convention without
heralding a “vast expansion of congressional power.”470 Without some subjectmatter limitation, “the possibilities of what the Federal Government may
accomplish” by treaty are so boundless as to allow it to usurp state sovereignty.471
As I have argued, Scalia’s (and Tucker’s) framing of foreign-aﬀairs
federalism as a problem of dual sovereignty simply overlooks the onceinﬂuential, now-dormant thought that the category of powers reserved “to
the people” is not an empty set: the treaty-making power cannot be used to
exercise powers that are denied to both governments by the popular sovereign.
Yet, on the concurring Justices’ view, the states’ sovereignty is made the
relevant limit to the treaty-making power.
This dual-sovereignty view of the treaty-making power is blinkered not
only to more robust ideas about the Tenth Amendment’s limitations on
treaty-making, but also to the pragmatic diﬃculties occasioned by separating
“domestic”472 treaties from those of “legitimate international”473 concern.
This proposed limitation invites the practical critique that being too solicitous
465 Id. at 852-53; see also id. at 874 n.5 (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing waiver of a commerceclause defense).
466 Id. at 860, 863.
467 Id. at 867 (Scalia, J., concurring).
468 Id. at 881 (Scalia, J., concurring).
469 See supra text accompanying notes 457-458.
470 Id. at 877 (Scalia, J., concurring).
471 Id. at 878 (Scalia, J., concurring).
472 Id. at 883 (Thomas, J., concurring).
473 Id. at 897 (Alito, J., concurring).
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of state sovereignty can make the Constitution a suicide pact in matters of
true national exigency: the resolution of some existential threats to the
republic are prone to be at once classically “international” and enormously
municipally invasive. Those who are skeptical of the national treaty-making
power but have decided on a dual-sovereign model of federalism are
committed to argue either that the Constitution annihilated the capacity to
make municipally invasive “domestic” treaties, or constrained the treatymaking power to an undeﬁned zone of “legitimate” international interest.
In light of a century’s worth of municipally invasive treaties about getting
and spending land, the Bond concurrences’ eﬀort to limit the treaty-making
power to subjects of legitimate international intercourse is most diﬃcult to
square with our history of acquisition. In earlier eras, the eﬀort to constrain
treaty-making to embrace only objects of “international intercourse”474 rather
than those that “conceal[] a police power over domestic aﬀairs”475 would
“syllogi[ze]” the new states (whose territory was acquired by treaty) “out of
the Union.”476 The most eﬀective constitutional opposition to these
municipally invasive treaties of acquisition was not that they trenched too far
on “domestic” matters, but it was rather the popular-sovereign objection:
these treaties infringed the reserved sovereignty of the people. The
acquisition of Texas and cession of Maine were unlawful because the
“disposition of sovereignty” cannot be “a subject of barter by governments.”477
In contrast to the dual-sovereignty view of the treaty-making power, the
limitations that popular-sovereign federalism would impose upon the federal
treaty power are few, but defensible. Acquisition, cession, and related trappings of
imperial (or non-republican) government are impermissible; no more, no less.478
My historical corrective—that the treaty-making power has previously
been limited by a popular-sovereignty-based view of foreign-aﬀairs
federalism—has lessons for modern “nationalists” and “new federalists” alike.
To today’s nationalists, the imperial history suggests that the marriage of
dual-sovereign federalism with the idea of an absolutely sovereign federal
Id. at 885 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 894 (Thomas, J., concurring).
3 REGISTER OF DEBATES IN CONGRESS, supra note 247, at 43; See generally text
accompanying notes 247–251 (discussing the “old” states’ opposition to the cession of public lands
to the new states in which they lay).
477 COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., supra note 103, at 23; see also text accompanying notes 130–
139 (discussing Massachusetts’s opposition to Texas).
478 These limitations are, of course, in addition to individual-rights limitations expressly
imposed by the Constitution. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (“There is nothing in [the]
language [of the Supremacy Clause] which intimates that treaties and laws enacted pursuant to them
do not have to comply with the [other] provisions of the Constitution . . . .”); see also RESTATEMENT
(FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 107 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2016) (“A treaty
provision will not be given eﬀect as law in the United States to the extent that giving it this eﬀect
would violate any individual constitutional rights.”).
474
475
476
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government is part of an all-too-recent imperial project. That project reduced
the number of plausible “nationalist” theories of the treaty-making power to
one, by erasing the possibility that popular sovereignty modestly limits the
scope of a national treaty-making power while otherwise enlarging the ﬁeld
of permissible federal legislation. And to the “new-federalist” critics of the
treaty-making power—including, recently, three Justices of the Supreme
Court—recovering this history suggests that the popular contention that
today’s treaties are especially “domestic,” or especially municipally invasive,
overlooks the many episodes in which treaties remade the composition of the
republic by acquiring and ceding territory.479
To be sure, the popular-sovereignty-based limit upon treaties of
acquisition and cession is now implausible, having been litigated and
overcome during a century of bartering territory with other sovereigns.
Indeed, before the modern, canonical histories of the treaty-making power
became authoritative, proponents of an imperial treaty-making power
claimed that the most durable proof that the nation had acquiesced to an
imperial treaty power was that the opposition to such treaties had been
sophisticated, intense, and ultimately defeated. As Root argued, “[n]ot only
has the right of the Central Government to acquire territory been sustained,
but it has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the face of most bitter
factional opposition, evidenced on every occasion on which the
boundaries . . . have been extended.”480
The weakness of popular-sovereign federalism, moreover, lies in its
canonical unorthodoxy. If popular sovereignty limits the treaty-making
power, then foreign-aﬀairs sovereignty must be recast in either tripartite
(federal-state-popular) terms or as the antonym of dual-sovereign federalism
(the people, but neither the states nor the federal government, are sovereign).
Either view is now fantastically unimaginable. Insisting that some treatymaking powers are reserved to the popular sovereign is no longer taken to be
a plausible argument—it is, in Sutherland’s words, not “come-at-able.”481
Indeed, as a result of judicial settlement and inﬂuential historicist
arguments crafted in an imperial era, our public law now rejects the idea that
a dormant popular sovereign retains any important foreign-aﬀairs power.482
This canonical status of the dual-sovereign theory of foreign-aﬀairs
federalism is highly unlikely to change for at least two reasons.
479 Cf. Bond, 572 U.S. at 896 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting the “increasing frequency with
which treaties have begun to test the limits of the Treaty Power”).
480 War Department Memo, supra note 376, at 23.
481 Sutherland, supra note 54, at 380.
482 See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317 (1936)
(“Sovereignty is never held in suspense. When . . . the external sovereignty of Great Britain in
respect of the colonies ceased, it immediately passed to the Union.”).
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First, as discussed, the most obvious limitations that popular-sovereign
federalism might impose upon the treaty power—prohibiting acquisition or
cession—are the limits most breached in our history.
Second, the canonical understanding of the methods of public law
(international and American) has radically diverged. Whereas international
and American public law traveled together in charting the foreign-aﬀairs
federalism of the mid-nineteenth to early-twentieth century, they now use
materially diﬀerent grammars of argument.
The best illustration of this divergence is suggested by the last notable
episode of the new states’ eﬀort to wrest the eminent dominion from the
federal government. In October 1945, President Truman issued a
proclamation announcing that it would be his Administration’s policy that
“the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf ” are
“subject to [federal] jurisdiction and control.”483 The same year, the
government ﬁled an original-jurisdiction case in the Supreme Court, United
States v. California, contending that the federal government was the “owner in
fee simple of, or possessed of paramount rights in and powers over, the
lands . . . underlying the Paciﬁc Ocean . . . on the coast of California.”484
The parties’ brieﬁng in California evinces the baroque law-of-nations
reasoning that framed the prior century’s precedents. The government’s
opening brief, for example, began with a 30-page disquisition on the concept
of a “territorial sea” from the time of Roman law, as well as the “writings of
publicists.”485 California’s brief teed up a familiar question from the earlier
era: because riverbeds often debouch into the territorial sea, should not Hagan
apply to the land below that sea?
The Court agreed with the federal government that the sovereigntist logic
of Hagan actually entailed a national eminent dominion. As Justice Black
wrote for the majority, if Hagan gave state sovereigns the right to lands below
inland waters, that logic ultimately favored federal title to the seabed: unlike
inland rivers, these waters implicate “national interests [and] responsibilities,
and therefore national rights are paramount.”486 The California Court thus
used dual-sovereign federalism to favor a preferred sovereign—the federal
sovereign holds eminent dominion.487
Writing in dissent, Justice Frankfurter criticized the majority’s confusion
about the eminent dominion. Frankfurter explained Thayer’s old lesson that the
eminent dominion stood for many different things, some of which are
Proclamation 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (Oct. 2, 1945).
United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 22 (1947) (quoting the complaint).
See generally Brief for the United States in Support of Judgment, United States v.
California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
486 California, 332 U.S. at 36.
487 Id. at 38-39.
483
484
485
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incompatible with American public law.488 Lou Henkin’s first draft of the
opinion explained that “[t]he Court confuses ‘national dominion’ over land or
sea with property rights in such areas.”489 Although “the United States
exercise[d] national dominion, paramount sovereign power, over all the territory
that is properly in the United States . . . ,” that did not prove enough to give the
federal government title.490 If the federal government wished to prove “property
rights in the land in question, it can find no support for its claim to such rights
in the fact that it has exercised constitutional powers with regard to such
property.”491 Frankfurter added to Henkin’s draft that “[t]o speak of dominion
carries precisely those overtones in the law which relate to property and not to
political authority. Dominion . . . was concerned with property and ownership
as against imperium, which related to political sovereignty.”492 Frankfurter
explained that “of course the United States has ‘paramount rights’ in the sea
belt . . . . [But the] rights of ownership are something else.”493
Frankfurter took a moment to mark a critical shift in the methodology of
public international law since the prior century. He called for modernization,
arguing that the litigants had relied too heavily on the “dubious and tenuous
writings of publicists.”494 He also cited a just-published Harvard Law Review
article that explained how an “inductive” method of international law had
now overtaken the “deductive” approach of days past.495 The old deductivists
now failed to “grapple seriously with the systematic presentation of the
practice of individual states.”496 Justice McKinley’s old law-of-nations
reasoning, Frankfurter explained, had led the Court astray.497
Frankfurter’s emphasis in these cases on the changing sources and
methods of international legal argument coincided with international eﬀorts
to ﬁrm up the discipline as a more positivist, scientiﬁc enterprise. His
description of the way international law is found and described has ascended
as the dominant mode of public international legal argument.498
Id. at 44-45 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Lou Henkin, Draft of Dissent of Justice Frankfurter in United States v. California, 332
U.S. 19 (1947), at 3 (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with author).
490 Id.
491 Id.
492 Felix Frankfurter, Draft of Dissent in United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947), at 1
(unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with author).
493 Id. at 2.
494 United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 43 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
495 Id. at 43 (citing Georg Schwartzenberger, The Inductive Approach to International Law, 60
HARV. L. REV. 539, 540-41 (1947)).
496 Id. at 561.
497 California, 332 U.S. at 43-45 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
498 In the end, Congress vindicated Frankfurter, and passed the Submerged Lands Act of 1953,
Pub. L. No. 90-583, 82 Stat. 1146 (codiﬁed at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1356b (2018)), to repudiate the
California rule. See United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 6 (1997) (explaining that the Submerged
488
489
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Notwithstanding the modernization of public international law, American
public law is still prone to practice the old ways. As Sarah Cleveland has
explained, Justice Sutherland expressly forced a dual-sovereigntist frame onto
nearly all constitutional questions touching upon foreign aﬀairs, though the
roots of his views are quite old.499 Little, however, secures Sutherland’s
conceit in the modern Supreme Court.500
In taking up the Court’s invitation to reappraise the foreign-aﬀairs
settlements of the early-twentieth century, it is worth considering whether
the post-Holland debate over dual-sovereign federalism has exhausted all
plausible theories of the people’s delegation of foreign-aﬀairs powers to their
governments. That is especially so if the imperial era to which this orthodoxy
belongs is no longer a part of our public law. While the early-twentiethcentury settlements make reviving a popular-sovereign foreign-aﬀairs
federalism impossible, deﬁning subject-matter limitations on the treaty
power in light of our “dual sovereign” federalism is equally indefensible.
CONCLUSION
What are today at least three discrete public law puzzles were in earlier
eras a single question: can American governments, by exercising the treatymaking power, lay claim to the eminent dominion, as that idea is understood
in the law of nations? Today, by contrast, we ask disparate questions that yield
provincial (and highly contingent) answers: (1) Can the government acquire
territory by treaty? Yes—Chief Justice Marshall put that question to rest. (2)
Can the federal government dismember the empire by a treaty of cession?
No—the Federalist Papers are skeptical. (3) Can the federal government hold title
to public land within the states? Plainly. (4) What is the political status of
acquired territories? That is up to Congress. (5) Finally, are there subject-matter
limitations on either the treaty-making power or the legislation-giving effect
to treaties? No, in light of Missouri v. Holland. All of these were interconnected
“eminent dominion” questions in mid-nineteenth- to early-twentieth-century
national politics, but they could not be further apart in today’s constitutional
law canon. After all, whose mind now runs from treaties to takings?

Lands Act “conﬁrm[ed] States’ equal footing rights” with the federal government); 42 Op. Att’y
Gen. at 252 (“The general purpose of the Submerged Lands Act was ‘to restore’ to the States and
persons claiming under the States what was ‘taken away from them’ by the decision in [California].”).
499 See Cleveland, Powers Inherent, supra note 58, at 273-77 (arguing that Sutherland’s holding
in Curtiss-Wright “was rooted directly in the principles of dual federalism and the peculiarly
unattractive and illiberal view of national power that characterized the late-nineteenth-century
inherent powers cases”).
500 See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2089-90 (2015) (ﬁnding Sutherland’s
description of the Executive’s foreign-aﬀairs powers overbroad).
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This Article revives a view of popular-sovereign federalism that once
flourished in the American reception of the eminent dominion and in related
conflicts regarding acquisition and cession. The records left behind are rich
catalogues of federalism in practice. They are also evidence of the republic’s
almost immediate embrace of a common-law constitutionalism, which selectively
deployed the law of nations to spar about national—and then imperial—politics.
As I have argued, our constitutional experience has rendered both the old
popular-sovereign limitations and the proposed new state-sovereignty
limitations on the treaty-making power impossible to reconcile with the shape
of the modern republic. We have not, by contrast, advanced a durable answer
to the political status of the insular territories. Instead, the Court remains
ﬁxated on a history of the imperial possessions’ eminent dominion that is
nearly impossible to distinguish from the genesis of the new states. The
Court’s pretense that the identiﬁcation of “deep” federal “wellsprings” in our
acquired territory should resolve the question of the insular territories’
“sovereignty” is historically dubious. It is, for related reasons, deeply suspect
as a mode of structuring modern American government.
Remarkably, nearly every one of the losing partisans described in this
Article expected their remedy in the infamy of history. Whether they sought
to wrest title from the federal government or to resist the tide of American
imperialism, those who reﬂected on their moment in constitutional time
expected their adversaries to become infamous in the eyes of future
generations who soberly reﬂected on the past.
Our foreign-aﬀairs originalism, which ordinarily ﬁnds constitutional
meaning in historicist sorties into the past, has made these partisans’ hope
vain. The eminent-dominion debates simply disclose to us what we already
knew: the American constitutional regime has acquiesced to and been
irretrievably changed by many intense episodes of constitutional politics.
Such episodes, when they arise anew, require lawyers practicing public law to
do their thinking for themselves. The “deepest wellsprings”501 of the past are
as prone to erase as to reveal our Constitution’s meaning.
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